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A primary mission of the Naval War College is to enhance the ability of our students to think 
critically and to conduct rigorous and data-driven analysis of competing alternatives. When our 
alumni return to the operational environment, they are better able to perform as effective decision 
makers at the highest levels, in all conditions of peace, conflict, and war.
 The College also has a role to play beyond meeting the needs of our student body, and that 
is to facilitate thoughtful discussions among national security leaders, planners, and operators 
through a series of wargames, simulations, workshops, and conferences. In pursuit of this larger 
goal, we hosted the “Breaking the Mold: War and Strategy in the 21st Century” workshop in 
March 2018. A broad overview of the topics discussed and some preliminary findings worthy of 
additional study are detailed in this document. The goal of the workshop was to demand thinking 
that was bold, yet based on fact and sound strategic and operational logic.
 With a future that remains unpredictable, hugely dynamic, and in many ways more challenging 
than at any time in our history, we need to rely on our intellect to shape and propose appropriate 
constructs and strategies for ensuring the security of this nation and our many friends and allies. 
As President, I am profoundly grateful for the hard work of the participants and organizers who 
made this event possible. I am sure you will find much to consider within the pages that follow.
 
         




Introduction to the Workshop/ 
Categorized List of Actionable Recommendations
The “Breaking the Mold: War and Strategy in the 21st Century” workshop was conducted under 
the sponsorship of the Under Secretary of the Navy at the Naval War College on March 7–8, 
2018. The fifty-nine participants were invited on the basis of their expertise in national defense 
issues; their leadership, operational, or analytical experience within the Department of Defense, 
Department of State, or other agencies or academic institutions; and their community reputations 
as creative thinkers.
The workshop was intended as a functional “experiment” in a top-down approach to generating 
novel ideas that “break the mold of conventional thinking” concerning necessary changes in the 
national security plans, processes, and organization of the United States.
This depiction of the concept of experiment reflects the fact that the workshop was not conceived as 
a stand-alone event, but was envisioned as part of an evolving process in generating “radical” ideas 
in which other participants and the Naval War College faculty would subsequently participate.
Under Secretary of the Navy Thomas B. Modly provided the kickoff to the workshop. His ex-
tensive remarks covered the naval services’ need to “break the mold” in considering a future that 
could be even more complicated and challenging than today’s. Secretary Modly’s full address 
appears in this Report as appendix 1.
The workshop was conducted by Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley, USN, President of the Naval 
War College (NWC), assisted by Dr. Harlan K. Ullman, distinguished senior fellow and visit-
ing professor at NWC. The participants were challenged to think “boldly and creatively about 
the future with few restraints other than the laws of physics,” and that “the crucial guiding and 
operative principle is to think boldly and creatively” so as “to provoke imaginative and even 
counterintuitive” ideas.” These few restraints included the following entering assumptions (in 
abbreviated form):
• Budget appropriations will continue to be (far) less than is required to maintain the current 
force structure, strategic and operational requirements, and deployments.
• Power will continue to diffuse, empowering individuals and nonstate groups at the expense 
of traditional states.
• Serious potential threats will continue to arise from nonmilitary and nonkinetic sources, to 
include “active measures”; cyber; creative use of economic and mercantile policies; intimi-
dation; misinformation, propaganda, and misdirection; interference in domestic politics; and 
more innovative use of military power to achieve political objectives.
• Offensive, precision weapons and C4ISR will tend to dominate defenses, meaning deception 
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and maneuver will be more critical. So too logistical and C4ISR networks will become more 
vulnerable.
• The doctrine of most states with advanced weapons stresses the advantage of firing the first 
shot, that is, anticipating an enemy’s actions and striking preemptively.
• Nuclear arms talks—INF and New Start—will fail and the United States will withdraw from 
the JCPOA with Iran. But rather than resulting in an arms race, modernization will lead to 
self-imposed limits on U.S and Russian strategic forces. Meanwhile, China will continue to 
pursue a more technologically advanced but still minimum nuclear deterrent.
• NATO will experience continued erosion as certain unnamed but known allies pursue differ-
ent courses and Brexit distances the United Kingdom from Europe.
• The U.S. political system will remain polarized and highly divisive, and growing deficits, 
along with interest rate increases, will provide a major, possibly crippling constraint on mili-
tary forces.
• No global financial or environmental catastrophe will occur.
The future environment was described as follows: “In general terms, the world of 202X is one 
marked by the continued diffusion of power and globalization. Qualitatively, the military forces 
of the United States and several NATO and Asian allies, Russia, and China have become relative-
ly equal in advanced capability, but with significant strategic distinctions. Russian forces remain 
centered on Europe and the protection of Russia, with small but effective deployments abroad. 
China’s military remains a high-low mix, with many PLA units less well-equipped than others 
due to financial constraints.”
Against the future described above, the working groups were provided the outline of three stra-
tegic options to be used to guide responses to “war” in the 21st century and break the mold of 
conventional thinking: (1) A “porcupine defense,” undertaken in part in conjunction with Naval 
Forces Europe and focused on Europe and Russia; (2) Containing potential Chinese military 
expansion within the “first island chain” with “a mobile maritime Maginot Line plan that cannot 
be outflanked”; and (3) Greater reliance on special forces, cyber, and unmanned vehicles (UVs), 
all broadly defined. A fourth area for examination is the question of how such options might be 
implemented. This suggests (4) “Redefining the National Security Act and Unified Command 
Plan, along with a reconstitution and regeneration of forces in which a smaller but highly ready 
active-duty force would be dependent on a larger reserve or cadre component that could be mobi-
lized when or if needed.”
To the degree there was a central idea permeating the four working groups in encouraging a 
“break-the-mold” mindset, it was to induce ideas that would exploit a cost-exchange strategy 
designed to defeat potential adversaries by circumventing, neutralizing, and containing their 
strategic thinking.
As general guidance, the working groups were challenged to examine:
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• What might these strategic options entail?
• What basic assumptions would undergird each option?
• What would be each option’s strengths and weaknesses?
• How would the entire defense and manpower base support each option?
• Would these options be affordable, given the reality of the resources available?
Appendix 2 contains the full statements of guidance and precepts for the workshop.
The workshop was organized using NWC resources and also received generous support from the 
Naval War College Foundation.
To “prime the pump” and establish an atmosphere of “radical” thinking, a series of 12 point 
papers on individual proposals were provided to the participants in advance. Some of the point 
papers were referenced in the subsequent discussions, some were not. In addition to a contribu-
tion by the NWC Provost, Dr. Lewis Duncan, the point papers were drafted by faculty members 
of NWC and the Naval Postgraduate School, primarily—but not exclusively—by members of the 
NWC Center for Naval Warfare Studies. The point papers are included as appendix 3.
TASK
The overall objective of the workshop was to generate actionable recommendations that would 
“break the mold” of current U.S. national security plans and processes. These recommendations 
are intended to be briefed to selected decision makers and to be used for additional analysis by 
NWC faculty members.
The entering assumption of the project, in the words of Dr. Ullman, is that “if we are serious in 
pursuing a more lethal Navy [and more effective national security overall], we need to break the 
mold of past thinking because, under those conditions, without a huge and virtually impossible 
increase in budgets, that goal is not achievable for decades.” This entering argument provides 
considerable incentive for creative thought and novel, nontraditional defense concepts. Yet at the 
same time it requires grounding in the realities of the geopolitical environment and the realities 
of cost and budget. While as novel as possible, the thinking also was required to remain within 
the art of the possible, with the collective expertise and experience of the participants providing 
the knowledge of that art.
FOCUS
In his address to the workshop participants, Under Secretary Modly pointed to the speed of 
change as the prime motivator for breaking free of “organizational paradigms, and behaviors, and 
biases.” He observed that after 911 DoD adapted “tactics and capabilities quite well” in militarily 
addressing terrorist threats. However, this effort at “cracking the mold,” while successful, “may 
not be enough because no longer are we faced with a single rogue terrorist actor, rather we are 
faced with a broad and varied spectrum of them.”
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Moreover, the new National Defense Strategy (NDS) identifies “changes that have eclipsed the 
dangers these rogue actors, and rogue nations, have presented over the past decade. . . . We are 
entering an era of great-power competition on a global scale, so we must be focused on responsi-
bly developing forces that protect our people and our interests, our friends and allies around the 
world.” Noting that “China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian 
model and they will use whatever tools that are available to them, both lethal and nonlethal, legal 
and illegal, to gain influence and authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and secu-
rity decisions,” Under Secretary Modly described the NDS as providing a “mandate for how we 
construct our naval forces” to address a “broad range of competing challenges” that include:
• A return to great-power competition, but not to the exclusion of other threats.
• An emphasis on lethality and readiness, but not to the exclusion of new platforms and tech-
nologies for the future fight.
• A recognition that we must advance our nation’s interest and influence on the seas, but not 
to the exclusion of building alliances and partnerships that seek peaceful conflict resolution, 
with preparedness for the use of decisive force if necessary.
Under Secretary Modly suggested that the “preeminent focus” in breaking the mold of old para-
digms was the need to achieve organizational “agility.” He defined the characteristics of agility 
within the Department of the Navy in terms of providing “flexible, adaptable, faster development 
cycles, reduced maintenance requirements, greater lethality, and an industrial strategy that sus-
tains a modern, flexible, and sustainable industrial base.” To sustain the naval industrial base, the 
mold of an “adversarial relationship with industry” certainly needs to be broken and “we must 
also understand the difference between being a smart buyer and a bad customer.” Additionally, 
agility in organization is needed to “recruit and train people who are innovative, creative, and 
courageous, . . . who are comfortable with uncertainty and who can collaborate and trust their 
teams and leaders under stressful conditions.”
The Under Secretary identified five organizational qualities that “will contribute to a more agile 
Navy”: (1) velocity or speed, (2) adaptability, (3) collaboration, (4) visibility, and (5) innovation, 
which is strengthened by a culture of lifelong learning. He concluded by predicting that “we will 
have to break the mold” to truly embrace agility.
ORGANIZATION
The discussions were conducted and findings generated within four working groups. Each 
group was organized around one of the themes previously suggested by Dr. Ullman. Group 1 
was assigned the concept of a “porcupine strategy” for the defense of NATO/Europe. Group 2 
organized around the concept of a mobile maritime barrier (“a maritime Maginot Line plan”) in 
the Asia-Pacific. Group 3 considered “the new conventional triad” of special operation forces 
(SOFs), unmanned systems, and cyber-warfare capabilities (a construct originally suggested by 
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Admiral James Stavridis, USN [Ret.]).1 Group 4 considered a new National Security Act and 
recreation of a national security organization, to include all U.S. government agencies.
A narrative of each of the four working group discussions and copies of their final outbriefs are 
contained within this report as chapters 2 to 5, respectively. The briefing slides included were 
presented to the full workshop, including the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William 
Moran, USN. The slides represent the agreed-upon findings of each group. The narratives, in 
contrast, attempt to capture discussions and conclusions on the basis of notes taken at the ses-
sions. Although the narratives were drafted by individuals, the members of each working group 
had opportunities to comment on their narrative following the workshop. While not claiming to 
represent an absolute consensus, the report reflects every effort to come close to a common view 
of what was discussed. Each group was allowed the discretion to brief and discuss its proceed-
ings and findings in the way its members judged best. Despite core commonality, the narratives 
and briefings of chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 are not strictly uniform in approach, style, or content, 
but reflect the individualities of each group. In certain cases, they deviate considerably from the 
guidance provided in the starting precepts, going far beyond, for example, the original concept of 
a porcupine strategy or a mobile barrier.
CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS
Since the workshop was not designed to form a consensus across groups and did not seek to pri-
oritize recommendations, a consolidation of these recommendations does not reflect an order of 
precedence or relative degree of achievability.
However, Group 1 did create a scattergram (also called a scatter graph and scatter plot) that 
illustrates their recommendations on axes of difficulty (of achievement) versus effectiveness (in 
potential outcome). This indexed graphic not only effectively illuminates Group 1 discussions, 
but provides a potential plan of action for countering Russian “gray-zone” activities in the Euro-
pean region. It is contained in the briefing slide section of chapter 2.
Recommendations from other groups are not necessarily well represented by scattergrams; 
however, it is possible to categorize all the recommendations into areas by which they could be 
assigned more easily for action within the Department of the Navy or Department of Defense. 
To place the recommendations of the four working groups within a context of Department of the 
Navy/Department of Defense decision-making, they have been extracted from the narratives/
slides and reaggregated into the following four categories: (a) alternative strategy development, 
(b) alternative operational planning and capabilities, (c) acquisition and R&D reforms, and (d) 
organizational and personnel policy changes. Several of the recommendations could also fall 
within multiple categories. If they were implemented, all could have effects and require changes 
in all the categories.
1.  James Stavridis, “The New Triad: It’s Time to Found a U.S. Cyber Force,” Foreign Policy (web edition), June 20, 
2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/20/the-new-triad.
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a. Alternative Strategy Development
Group 1: A Porcupine Strategy for Europe
• Grow Forward-Deployed Navy Force-Europe (FDNF-E) and tailor its traditional rotational 
forces for deployment to specific areas within Europe/Middle East.
• Restructure the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) away from traditional-force power-pro-
jection packages toward cost-imposing approaches (detailed in chapter 2) around establishing 
a “no man’s land” extending out to a 200-mile radius in which no force can safely operate.
• Deepen NATO cyberspace defense capabilities and enhance NATO counter-messaging centers.
• Formalize procedures to allow swift formation and deployment of “coalitions of the willing” 
for situations outside of NATO purview or when NATO will not act. In support of this, exper-
iment with subregional organizations to complement NATO efforts.
• Conduct strategic communications and information operations into Russia to disseminate 
Western values and truths, while better illuminating Russian actions.
• Stop avoiding contested international seas and airspace—without being unduly provoca-
tive—to preserve the current rules-based international order.
Group 2: A Mobile Maritime Barrier in Asia
• Avoid an initial high-end maritime battle within the first island chain, and then operate within 
the first island chain under carefully considered and delineated conditions.
• Extend the U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty to include the Philippine claims of their 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
• Continue the U.S.-Japanese annual navy-to-navy ANNUALEX events, moving the location 
to west of the Ryukyu Islands.
• Employ a system of missiles, mines, and unmanned systems, at sea and ashore, to establish 
land-based batteries across island chains in the Pacific for choke point control and denial and 
localized sea control and denial.
• Consider maritime forces as conducting “nonplatform-centric warfare” or “launch-platform” 
warfare, under which anything that can launch an unmanned system, weapon, or sensor is con-
sidered a warship (rather than the “platform-based” war at sea characteristic of World War II).
• Develop and deploy a U.S. maritime militia.
• Address the speed of escalation and the control of that speed as an inherent part of the mili-
tary competition.
• Manage national hedging strategies to encourage allies and partners to deploy maritime militias even 
in the face of questionable levels of cooperation with the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and others.
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• Increase U.S. Coast Guard and allied coast guard operations in East Asian waters.
• Increase presence in port facilities in Vietnam, Indonesia, and other nations (and political 
leverage in those countries), thereby forcing China to face third-nation considerations in 
actions against the United States.
• Improve facilities in the Marianas, Palau, and Micronesia as logistics bases for U.S. and 
allied actions within the second island chain.
Group 3: The New Conventional Triad
• Develop a coherent strategy for the development and employment of the new conventional 
triad of SOF-like fleet/unmanned systems (UsX)/cyber.
• Integrate UxS as an integral element of distributed maritime operations (DMOs).
• Ensure that the Force Structure Assessment implements the new conventional triad.
Group 4: Organizing for National Defense
• Develop an integrated, whole-of-government national security strategy based on a national 
security threat analysis, aligned with a unified national security budget.
b. Alternative Operational Planning and Capabilities
Group 1: A Porcupine Strategy for Europe
• Bolster NATO force integration units (NFIUs) and Multinational Division-Southeast (MND-
SE) Headquarters, including the use of theater special operations command (T-SOC) plan-
ning and execution processes.
• Surge greater numbers of NATO ships and aircraft into the Black Sea.
• Deploy antiship cruise missiles and air-defense systems into the Baltic and Black Seas to 
counter Russian power-projection capabilities.
• Openly stockpile land and naval mines in the Black Sea region while simultaneously prepar-
ing capabilities to clear straits and choke points in the event of conflict.
• Deploy nationwide warnings and message-dissemination “apps” to produce “crowd-sourced” 
information and to fight against disinformation.
• Use mountain or underground facilities to harden key command and control, operational, and 
warfighting facilities and systems.
• Develop the capability to use swarming tactics, techniques, and technology in the gray zone 
and in open conflict.
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Group 2: A Mobile Maritime Barrier in Asia
• Deploy a completely autonomous, unmanned air wing by 2023.
• Deploy a completely autonomous, unmanned surface and subsurface action group by 2028.
• Develop a seabed-warfare capability (more than MIW, ASW, or USW), constructive and 
destructive, for attack and defense.
• Develop and deploy containerized missiles and drones for placement on vessels other than 
USN warships.
• Develop a full range of capabilities for deception operations and decoys.
c. Acquisition and R&D Reforms
Note: All working groups identified the need for significant—and severe—acquisition reform.
Group 1: A Porcupine Strategy for Europe
• Increase maritime SOF training and capability development (particularly for gray-zone  
operations).
Group 2: A Mobile Maritime Barrier in Asia
• Stop purchasing and deploying short-range aircraft.
• Stop building and deploying high-signature surface warships and support ships.
• Stop acquiring systems that must rely on forward-located shore bases.
• Trade off new platforms to develop and deploy advanced, survivable 21st-century bat-
tle-management capabilities, to include targeting, weapon-target pairing, advanced tactical 
decision aids, and information cloud.
• Make the Kennedy the last CVN and procure air-capable ships of different types. (Note: This 
will still allow the Navy to have seven CVNs in the fleet through 2047.)
• Increase the payload-to-platform ratio on all warships, especially SSNs, with the use of 
towed payload modules.
Group 3: The New Conventional Triad
• Embrace prototyping, use commercial development, and focus experimentation on the ele-
mental capabilities for the new conventional triad of SOF-like fleet/UsX/cyber.
• Increase CRADAs with commercial AI businesses.
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• Integrate capabilities for the new conventional triad, fully develop TTP, enable prototype 
transitions, and protect from traditional Program of Record (POR) acquisition-management 
procedures.
d. Organizational and Personnel Policy Changes
Group 1: A Porcupine Strategy for Europe
• NATO: Delegate greater military response authorities to Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR) and streamline the North Atlantic Council’s decision-making processes, all to 
allow for faster force generation and more-timely action.
• Integrate law-enforcement authorities and capabilities to better detect and act against provo-
cations in the gray zone.
• NATO: Stop investments by some nations in procurement of traditional large ships, aircraft, 
and ground forces. Instead, encourage the procurement of small, inexpensive-but-lethal 
platforms, such as suicide drone boats and unmanned aerial vehicles (such as Israel’s Harpy 
weapons).
• Stop using predictable deployment patterns and locations by avoiding “heel-to-toe” deployments.
Group 2: A Mobile Maritime Barrier in Asia
• Take an expanded view of artificial intelligence, as an ecosystem within which the Navy and 
its decision makers operate, rather than holding to a view that artificial intelligence is merely 
another platform or technology.
• Open critical technical specialties to midcareer accessions.
• Ensure promotion is based on competence (i.e., decouple promotion from longevity).
• Make Mandarin or Russian a required major for selected USNA/NROTC midshipmen (and/
or require all midshipmen to take courses in one of those languages).
• Ensure that foreign affairs officers (FAOs) have a competitive career path.
• Educate personnel in the “new” specialties of AI, information warfare, and robotics.
Group 3: The New Conventional Triad
• Establish a cross-Navy strategic/asymmetric thinking unit to address the new conventional 
triad of SOF-like fleet/UsX/cyber, and assess execution across programs.
• Increase the capabilities of OPNAV N9I to ensure that the Force Structure Assessment imple-
ments the new conventional triad.
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• Mandate that cyber threats be incorporated into all wargaming scenarios.
• Mature the inclusion of AI as a tool for wargaming.
Group 4: Organizing for National Defense
• Institute a “National Security Service” to create a career process that promotes maximum 
interagency knowledge and experience and fosters cooperation between personnel assigned 
to different agencies.
• Develop national security SES/flag officers: well-rounded, senior DoD leaders capable of inte-
grating whole-of-government approaches to respond to regional and global security challenges.
• Establish regional interagency authorities (RIAs) in lieu of combatant commands and civil-
ian-agency outposts, to include (1) a senior civilian head with deep regional experience, (2) a 
military deputy (the former combatant commander) with authority over U.S. military actors 
in the region, and (3) a civilian deputy with “regional ambassador” status and coordinating 
authority over country ambassadors and other civilian organizations operating within the 
region.
APPRECIATION
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pants for their contributions to the success of the workshop, especially the following individuals: 
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CAPT Adam Aycock, USN; Prof. William Glenney; and Dr. David Cooper.
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CHAPTER 2
A “Porcupine Strategy” for Europe
The Issue
The nation and the Navy face a resurgent, revisionist Russia that seeks to challenge aspects 
of the existing international order that Moscow views as impediments to its prosperity and its 
rightful place on the international stage. To accomplish its goals, Russia is working to enhance 
its buffer zones (especially into the Baltic and Black Seas), to extend its reach into the eastern 
Mediterranean and the Arctic, and to control energy supply routes to Europe and Asia. Moscow 
is enhancing its buffer zones by consolidating Russian control over Crimea, fomenting instability 
in eastern Ukraine, encouraging fissures in NATO and the EU, and perpetuating frozen conflicts 
along its periphery. Moscow also seeks the “Finlandization”2 of the Black and Baltic Sea coun-
tries, peeling these former Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations—and possibly Turkey—away from 
the West and NATO.
Although Russia may use forms of indirect and diverse long-distance forms of coercion, such as 
using energy resources as a lever, it likely does not have territorial ambitions in EU and NATO 
countries. Likewise, Moscow’s pursuit of control over energy markets is tied to its desire for 
domestic stability, since much of its economy and the government’s budget depend on exports 
of petroleum and natural gas. The concept of hybrid warfare and the threat of the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons to force conflict termination on terms favorable to Russia appear to be parts of 
the Russian approach.3 Investments in international energy and the Arctic and procurement of the 
assets needed to protect those investments may be viewed as parts of Moscow’s holistic approach 
to using all elements of national power.
The Questions
How does the U.S. Navy prepare itself to succeed in a 30-year competition with Russia in Eu-
rope? What roles does the Navy play in supporting the U.S. national interest in maintaining 
the rules-based global order in the face of the Chinese and Russian national interests in a pow-
er-based global order in which concepts of balance of power and spheres of influence prevail?
Ends: Assure, Deter, and Compel
Assure Allies and Partners—and Russia
Central to assuring allies and potential partners is the continuance of the U.S. commitment 
to maintain and strengthen the rules-based international order, and doing so in the face of the 
power-based global order that Russia and China are pursuing. The United States will continue 
2. This term refers to the post–World War II situation in which Finland favored, or at least did not oppose, the Soviet 
Union in the economic and foreign policy spheres without being politically aligned to Moscow.
3. The point in any conflict at which Russia would consider using tactical nuclear weapons is a point of analytical 
contention. Terms used in this debate include escalate to deescalate and escalate to terminate.
12
to respect the rights of sovereign nations to choose their own political, defense, and economic 
relationships. In addition, the United States will foster respect for international laws and norms, 
including freedom of navigation and the high seas.
In addition to assuring allies and partners, the United States will work to assure Russia that 
the United States does not pose a demonstrable threat to Russia and will not act to undermine 
Russian internal stability. Likewise, the United States should convince Moscow that Russia has 
options other than becoming a “resource colony” for China.
The United States will work to safeguard the security of its allies and partners. In part, the United 
States can promote collective security by setting conditions that enable NATO and the European 
Union to spend more on defense, and by ensuring guarantees under article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty.
Deter Russia
Even as the United States is reassuring Russia, it also should deter some aspects of Russian 
behavior that are attempting to impose Russia’s will, and in so doing to limit the national sover-
eignty and freedom of other states.
Deterrence will be applied to prevent subversion and threats of escalation in gray-zone actions 
(i.e., situations in which military or paramilitary coercion is used, but cannot necessarily be at-
tributed to Russia) that undermine NATO and other U.S. allies and partners. Actions will include 
specific counters to prevent Russian manipulation of supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) systems outside of Russia. Of particular importance will be deterring Russian actions 
aimed at separating Turkey from NATO.
Actions will be taken to delegitimize the concepts of spheres of influence and areas of privilege, 
as these concepts undermine the independence of nations and groups within those spheres and 
areas, and are an effort by Moscow to codify a “new normal” of dominance of its “near abroad.”
Actions will be taken to deter Russian employment of overt military force as a traditional form 
of aggression, and other actions by Russia to neutralize maritime border states in the Baltic and 
Black Sea regions.
Compel Russia to Stop
Recognizing that assurance and deterrence of Russia may not be sufficient, the United States 
must have a set of capabilities and be ready to act to compel changes in Russian behaviors that 
contradict international norms. Specific behaviors that must stop include:
• Efforts to limit freedom of navigation (FON) and overflight operations in international waters 
and airspace, with a particular focus on stopping unsafe intercepts of foreign aircraft and 
dangerous overflights of NATO warships.
• Jamming radio broadcasts, cellular networks, global positioning systems, and civilian com-
munications within neighboring states, especially during nearby Russian military exercises.
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• Intruding into and interfering with domestic political systems and processes in other nations 
through cyberspace and disinformation campaigns.
• Fomenting unrest in neighboring states through actions by pro-Russian ethnic groups and 
mercenaries.
• Using energy and energy infrastructure control as a political and economic weapon.
Means
The means to carry out the porcupine strategy for Europe are not in and of themselves new, 
consisting as they do of a combination of conventional forces, SOFs, and cyberspace forces, all 
creating a competitive advantage by exploiting disruptive technologies that have been emerging 
from continual organizational innovation across the Department of Defense. In conventional 
terms, what is new is using all three forces in a coherent manner to execute the “ways” discussed 
below.
Ways
The series of “ways” are best addressed by the concepts of continue, commence, and cease.
Continue
The Navy should continue and grow its Forward Deployed Navy Force-Europe (FDNF-E) and 
tailor its traditional rotational forces for deployment to specific areas within Europe and the  
Middle East.
DoD should continue the European Deterrent Initiative (EDI) with investments in infrastructure, 
prepositioned capabilities, expanded training of combined forces, and rotation of U.S. forces. At 
the same time, the United States should restructure EDI away from traditional-force power-pro-
jection packages toward cost-imposing approaches through use of SOFs, electronic attack, sup-
pression of air defenses, strike demonstrations, emplacement capabilities for improvised explo-
sive devices, deployment of antitank weapons, training of civil-military and paramilitary forces 
to prevent Russian destabilization efforts, and development of civilian “total defense” resistance 
and resilience capabilities.
NATO should bolster NATO force integration units (NFIUs) and Multinational Division-South-
east (MND-SE) Headquarters, including the use of theater special operations command (T-SOC) 
planning and execution processes, to enhance NATO capabilities.
NATO should deepen cyberspace defense capabilities and enhance counter-messaging centers 




In recognition that current U.S. capabilities and actions are not sufficient for the future, the fol-
lowing capabilities and activities should be started:
• Surge greater numbers of ships and aircraft into the Black Sea.
• Deploy antiship cruise missiles and air-defense systems into the Baltic and Black Seas to 
counter Russian power-projection capabilities. Openly stockpile land and naval mines in the 
region, while simultaneously preparing capabilities to clear straits and choke points to pre-
vent Russian attempts to close off these waterways or clear them in the event of conflict.
• Enhance the readiness of NATO member forces, delegate greater military-response author-
ities to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and streamline the North Atlantic 
Council’s decision-making processes, all to allow for faster force generation and more-timely 
action. Pursue organizational innovations and implement enhanced systems to ease command 
and control, planning, information sharing, and crisis response.
• Formalize procedures to allow swift formation and deployment of forces from “coalitions of 
the willing” for situations outside of NATO purview or when NATO will not act. In support 
of this, experiment with subregional organizations to complement NATO efforts.
• Streamline U.S., NATO, and allied cyberspace and information operations planning and 
approval processes, allowing more-effective employment of offensive cyberspace and infor-
mation capabilities to dissuade adversary actions and to impose fiscal and social costs on any 
adversary.
• Deploy nationwide warnings and message-dissemination “apps” to produce “crowd-sourced” 
information and to fight against disinformation.
• Conduct strategic communications and information operations into Russia to disseminate 
Western values and truths, while better illuminating Russian actions to disrupt U.S. and allied 
domestic political processes and to expose the corruption of Russian leaders.
• Distribute and disperse logistics facilities and capabilities to enhance their defense and sys-
tem resilience.
• Use mountain or underground facilities to harden key command and control, operational, and 
war-fighting facilities and systems.
• Implement comprehensive civil-defense actions to minimize casualties and maximize resil-
ience and recovery, should combat occur.
• Develop the capability to use swarming tactics, techniques, and technology in the gray zone 
and the fight, should it occur.
• Increase maritime SOF training and capability development.
• Integrate law-enforcement authorities and capabilities to better detect and act against provo-
cations in the gray zone.
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• Simplify acquisition rules and processes to speed development and deployment of new capa-
bilities and greater capacities.
Cease
The group identified three current actions that should cease:
• Stop investments by some nations in procurement of traditional large ships, aircraft, and 
ground forces because they consume precious resources, yet the capabilities or capacities 
they provide may not needed. Instead, encourage procurement of small, inexpensive, but 
lethal platforms, such as suicide drone boats and unmanned aerial vehicles (such as Israel’s 
Harpy weapons).
• Stop avoiding contested international seas and airspace—without being unduly provoca-
tive—to preserve the current rules-based international order.
• Stop using predictable deployment patterns and locations by avoiding “heel-to-toe” deploy-
ments.
Figure 1 displays a notional set of “ways” that Group #1 articulated, arranged to portray difficul-
ty versus effectiveness. The placement of any particular “way” is for illustrative purposes only; 
that “way” could be adjusted on the basis of a more detailed review.
Conclusion
The Navy’s ability in the future to meet the demands of U.S. national security interests depends 
on establishing a maritime strategy and making requisite changes in Navy culture  to maintain 
a deterrence and war-fighting edge over Russia in a 30-year competition in the gray zone and in 
conventional and nuclear environments. Such changes should enable the United States to assure, 
deter, and compel in Europe and against Russia as a peer military and a peer nation.
PNWC Remarks
• The working group findings can be translated specifically into a “porcupine strategy” by 
NATO members in the Black Sea region.
• Making Russian attempts to coerce NATO members more expensive (in multiple dimensions) 
and countering Russian active measures would complement NATO’s current posture (such as 
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A Mobile Maritime Barrier in Asia
The Issue
The nation and the Navy are involved in a 30-year, no-holds-barred competition with a peer 
adversary in the western Pacific. The current international mold—the rules-based global order of 
the post–World War II world—has been broken by the rise of China, the reemergence of Russia, 
and other national-level changes. Yet with regard to sea control and power projection, the U.S. 
Navy remains locked in its decades-old mold for maintaining and wielding maritime power.
The Questions
How does the U.S. Navy prepare itself to succeed in a 30-year competition in the gray zone, and 
to deny, defend, and defeat along a continuum from inside the first island chain to the mid-Pacific? 
What roles does the U.S. Navy play in supporting the U.S. national interest in maintaining the 
rules-based global order in the face of the Chinese and Russian national interests in a power-based 
global order?
Assumptions
Working Group #2 assumed that the nation and the U.S. Navy, over the course of a 30+-year 
competition with China, would be able to prevail (although not necessarily winning every engage-
ment or action)—but only if the changes delineated in this paper are made, and made quickly. 
The length of this competition is much longer, the intensity much stronger, and its nature more 
diverse than anything the United States and the U.S. Navy have experienced in over a hundred 
years.
China and Russia are now, or soon will become, peer military threats against which the U.S. 
Navy must be able to fight and prevail. Even if China does not grow into a peer military threat, it 
will become one in the economic realm.
The group assumed that the Navy, as the protector of the rules-based world order, would have to 
continue to be forward-deployed and forward-postured to succeed against a continuing-to-grow 
China as the primary defender of a power-based world order. Furthermore, as China grows 
economically, it will force a change from a world economy riding the tide of globalization to an 
economy driven heavily by Chinese expansionism.
The group assumed that the United States would retain its 2018 treaty allies and partners in the 
Indo-Asian region in the face of intense Chinese pressure, because of the strength of shared inter-
ests.
The group assumed that resource constraints will become tighter, with the budget being, at best, 
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flat, and more likely decreasing as the impacts of the staggering $25 trillion national debt play 
out.
The group assumed that over the next 10–15 years the rate of change of technology will continue 
to increase as the cutting edge of technology runs away from DoD and the United States moves 
deeper into the commercial world outside of the Western Hemisphere. The United States will not 
have a technological advantage, and the U.S. government will not necessarily own the technolo-
gy it needs for warfighting.
The Future War
For the time horizon of this work, the nature of maritime warfare in some ways will remain the 
same as today, and in other ways will change dramatically. What is best characterized as high-
end war at sea will remain a distinct possibility. Despite promises to the contrary regarding 
technology, fog, friction, and uncertainty will remain, and under many conditions will be more 
extreme than in the past.
Nuclear war will remain a threat, to include use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea, and even if 
the U.S. Navy does not use them, the Navy will need to be able to operate and fight in a battle 
space where others may have used nuclear weapons.
The capability of state and nonstate forces to mass effects without massing forces and without 
massing bases will continue to increase.
The lines demarcating the military from the nonmilitary increasingly will become blurred. The 
differences between what is ethical and what is nonethical also will blur.
The manners in which war can and will be waged will increase, to include the employment of a 
variety of nonkinetic electronic-warfare, information-warfare, and artificial-intelligence weap-
ons. Frequent reference was made to the depictions and discussions contained in “Unrestricted 
Warfare” by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui from 1999 as being more reflective of future war-
fare than any other document.
The application of maritime combat power will be less about traditional platforms and more 
about what is best called “nonplatform-centric warfare,” disconnecting the combat power from 
the hulls. The lines will continue to blur between military members and civilians as gray-zone 
activities and the forces employed in those zones expand. The ladder of escalation will be steeper 
and have many more rungs, presenting greater challenges to the fielding of effective forces, such 
as maritime militia.
The changes anticipated for future competition and future warfare will precipitate a wider variety 
of personnel requirements to man and support the Navy, and may well require a mobilization by 
society and industry to meet the personnel and material demands.
The competition, and even the war, will be continuous; the level and intensity may wax and 
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wane, but it will be continuous. The United States and the Navy must be ready for this duration. 
The Navy must develop the capability to hedge against high-end maritime warfare while com-
peting in the gray zone, space, the electromagnetic spectrum, and cyber space, and under the sea, 
continuously.
Recommended Approaches and Their Implications
The group’s maritime strategy is to preserve U.S. geostrategic interests in East Asia, including 
economic, military, and political interests, through maintenance of treaty alliances and partner-
ships. The overall concept, for the long term of 30 years, is to compete in the gray zone and deny, 
defend, and defeat along a continuum of actions, and to do so from inside the first island chain 
out to the mid-Pacific Ocean.
To execute this maritime concept, the Navy must grow in terms of numbers of platforms and air-
craft and in terms of war-fighting capabilities, and must expand its capabilities to operate as part 
of a joint and coalition force. The Navy must evolve from a heavily reactive posture and force 
into one that is proactive—almost provocative—in meeting U.S. national interests.
The Navy will focus on the maritime threat in the Pacific as part of maintaining maritime lines 
of influence in the region. For the U.S. Navy, Europe will become a secondary theater. Yet the 
combination of U.S. budgetary limits and some degree of deglobalization may increase pressures 
against the Navy being forward-deployed, at least to the levels and degree seen in the past five to 
ten years.
This concept will provide a hedge against the high-end maritime warfare outside the first island 
chain, allowing the Navy to optimize its strengths and capabilities. The goal will be to avoid an 
initial high-end maritime battle within the first island chain, and then to operate within the first 
island chain under carefully considered and delineated conditions.
The DoD and the Navy will act to vastly improve the maritime capabilities of allies and partners 
in the region through continued U.S. investment, coupled with maximum investment by those 
allies and partners. Disruptive technologies and unmanned systems will be a critical aspect of 
these investments.
In addition, it will become more important that actions taken and decisions made by the United 
States in the face of nearer-term challenges do not foreclose options needed to be prepared for the 
longer term and for options needed to gain an advantage over the 30-year duration of competition.
The Navy will develop and conduct options to impress U.S. intentions on China by, for example, 
extending the U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty to include the Philippines’ claims of their 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continuing to conduct the U.S.-Japanese annual navy-to-navy 
ANNUALEX events, moving the location to west of the Ryukyu Islands. These options will be 
pursued with the full understanding that China will object vigorously—diplomatically, economi-
cally, and quite likely militarily—against these allies and partners, and likely directly against the 
United States.
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The United States will strive for continued allied and partner support and participation to deny 
China sanctuary within the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas. In addition to developing 
and deploying low-cost maritime capabilities as necessary to maintain presence inside the first 
island chain and prevent the emergence of a sanctuary there, the United States and its allies and 
partners will signal China continuously in this regard.
Key Competitor’s Likely Responses
The group’s assessment was that, regardless of the actions taken by the Navy, and probably by 
the United States, these actions are unlikely to deter or change China’s long-term plans with 
regard to the United States, with the result still being a fully modernized PLA and PLA(N) by 
2049 or earlier. At the same time, it is likely that China will increase the speed of development 
and investment in military modernization and economic expansion as the international situation 
evolves over the next 30 years.
The Chinese will increase the use of political intimidation and economic and military pressure 
against U.S. allies and partners—specifically the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Australia—all to attempt to counter the U.S. strategy.
Any actions by the United States and its allies and partners that appear to change the strategic 
environment within the second island chain will be interpreted as threatening the power of and 
domestic control by the Chinese Communist Party, or as weakening Chinese sovereignty within 
the first island chain. This likely will cause the Chinese to react significantly and noticeably.
Arguably more important than the reaction by the Chinese will be reactions by U.S. allies and 
partners to U.S. actions and actions by the other allies and partners (e.g., what would be the reac-
tions of Indonesia and the Philippines to actions by the U.S. and Japan?).
Ideas to Break the Navy Culture
The group’s view was that the potential future environment and the demands placed on the Navy 
require that the existing Navy culture—as reflected in its capabilities and its maritime strategy—
be changed in terms of its investments and divestments, as well as its approach to the 30-year 
competition.
Invest and Divest to Deny, Defend, and Defeat
With the potential future war-fighting environment and the need for different capabilities, the 
current Navy POM and related 30-year shipbuilding plan are not sufficient for the future. Not 
only are new investments necessary, but new divestments also are needed. Ideas to invest and 
divest to deny, defend, and defeat include:
• Stop purchasing and deploying short-range aircraft.
• Stop building and deploying high-signature surface warships and support ships.
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• Stop acquiring systems that must rely on forward-located shore bases.
• Trade off new platforms in order to develop and deploy advanced, survivable, 21st-century 
battle-management tools, to include targeting, weapon-target pairing, advanced tactical deci-
sion aids, and information cloud.
• Make John F. Kennedy the last CVN and procure air-capable ships of different types. (Note: 
This will still allow the Navy to have seven CVNs in the fleet through 2047.)
• Deploy a completely autonomous, unmanned air wing by 2023.
• Deploy a completely autonomous, unmanned surface and subsurface action group by 2028.
• Develop a seabed-warfare capability (more than MIW, ASW, or USW), constructive and 
destructive, for attack and defense.
• Increase the payload-to-platform ratio on all warships, especially SSNs, with the use of 
towed payload modules.
• Develop and deploy containerized missiles and drones for placement on vessels other than 
USN warships.
• Develop a full range of capabilities for deception operations and decoys.
• Employ a system of missiles, mines, and unmanned systems, at sea and ashore, to establish 
land-based batteries across island chains in the Pacific for choke point control and denial, and 
localized sea control and denial.
• Consider the maritime force as conducting “nonplatform-centric warfare” or “launch-plat-
form warfare,” in which anything that can launch an unmanned system, weapon, or sensor 
is considered a warship, rather than the “platform-based” concept of war at sea, as in World 
War II. The entities of vehicles, weapons, and sensors should be considered more important 
than the traditional platforms.
• Take an expanded view of artificial intelligence as an ecosystem within which the Navy and 
its decision makers operate, rather than holding to a view that artificial intelligence is merely 
a platform or another technology.
• Educate personnel in Chinese languages. Make Mandarin (and Russian) required majors for 
selected USNA/NROTC midshipmen and/or require all midshipmen to take courses in Man-
darin (or Russian).
Competing in the Gray Zone for 30 Years
Competing in the gray zone, and doing so for three decades, requires a different mind-set and 
approach to maritime activities than the U.S. Navy has used. The Navy should:
• Develop and deploy a U.S. maritime militia.
• Address speed of escalation, and control of that speed, as an inherent part of the competition.
36
• Manage national hedging strategies to encourage allies and partners to deploy maritime mi-
litias, even in the face of questionable levels of cooperation with the Philippines, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and others.
• Increase U.S. Coast Guard and allied coast guard operations in East Asian waters.
• Increase presence in and political leverage through port facilities in Vietnam, Indonesia, and 
other nations, thereby forcing China to face third-nation considerations in actions against the 
United States.
• Improve facilities in the Marianas, Palau, and Micronesia as logistics bases for U.S. and 
allied actions within the second island chain.
• Educate personnel in the “new” specialties of AI, information warfare, and robotics.
• Ensure promotion cycles are based on competence (rather than longevity).
• Consider opening skilled technical billets to midcareer hires.
• Ensure that foreign affairs officers (FAOs) have a competitive career path.
Conclusion
The Navy’s ability in the future to meet the demands of U.S. national security interests is tied to 
a maritime strategy and requisite changes in Navy culture that allow success in a 30-year compe-
tition in the gray zone, and denying, defending, and defeating along a continuum from inside the 
first island chain to the mid-Pacific against China as a peer military and nation.
PNWC Remarks
Although the image of a “maritime Maginot Line plan” may seem paradoxical to those who view 
such a defense as failure, the actual Maginot Line was never penetrated by the Germans; they 
needed to outflank it to engage the Allied forces. A mobile maritime barrier could function the 
same way, by forcing the PLA to forgo attempting to build a global navy and confine their ambi-
tions to the land.
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The New Conventional Triad:
A SOF-Like Fleet/Service, Unmanned Systems, and Cyber
Introduction
Shortly after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions against 
Iraq through Resolution 661. With these new authorities, the Navy went to work in the North-
ern Arabian Gulf (NAG). The mission—sea control or blockade—might not have been new, but 
there were new challenges, such as those presented by the use by the adversary of cellphones 
and GPS, which required adaptation, innovation, and the right support to succeed. The Navy rose 
to the challenge. One could argue that the whole of the government rose to the challenge, if the 
diplomatic successes and the efforts in admiralty claims are also considered.
Fast forward to the Global War on Terror and the last ten years. This conflict has been dominated 
by special operations forces (SOFs). In the crucible of constant combat, SOFs have advocat-
ed for, and received, authorities for a more efficient acquisition process. They have developed 
tactics, techniques, and procedures that support agile operations. Embracing technology, they 
have become the most lethal human-machine weapon on the planet. And they have developed 
a professional culture that rewards (because it requires) innovative thinking. The challenge for 
the rest of the Navy—the institution and the fleet together—is to become “SOF-like.” The fleet 
can do it, with institutional support, as it did “back in the NAG.” According to the new National 
Defense Strategy and the latest Program Objective Memorandum (POM), the nation not only 
expects it but is putting the resources it can behind the effort. How must the Navy—the fleet and 
the overall institution—change?
The Issue
We are in a simmering war—operating phases of complex warfare—worldwide. The mold of our 
post–WWII global system is being broken, regardless of our involvement (or lack of involve-
ment) in the process. Current acquisition processes and levels of resource allocation are neither 
aligned nor agile enough to effectively counter current adversary efforts. Nor can they prepare 
the fleet for the full spectrum of future conflicts in an innovative fashion. A new course must be 
set and a higher speed of advance achieved if the Navy is to remain a viable tool for the nation in 
future competitions and conflict.
The Questions
How do we take the lessons of the last decade from our most seasoned, combat-effective, and 
successful forces (i.e., SOFs) and apply them to the Navy’s institutional processes and the fleet’s 
culture to create a Navy that is as reactive, agile, and effective as SOFs; that capitalizes on the 
potential for cost-effective results from an integrated unmanned system (UxS)-human fleet; and 
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that incorporates systemic cyber resilience while also providing offensive and defensive cyber 
capabilities?
Discussion
“You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” 
~ Former Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
We know today that there will be future conflict. We know that the current and future fleet is 
likely not optimized for that future conflict. While the former SECDEF’s words will always ring 
true, we can mitigate the negative effects of this inevitability by taking the rudder in hand today 
and shaping a better course for the future fleet. As it turns out, we have done this before.
Consider the challenge Marines overcame on November 25, 2001. More importantly, consider 
the tools the Marines had available that enabled them that day to conduct an amphibious assault 
more than 400 miles inland, taking the Taliban (and the world) by surprise. No beachhead was 
established—amphibious doctrine was thrown out the porthole. However, the conditions had to 
be set to make such a daring endeavor conceivable. Marine amphibious units were given addi-
tional special operations training. Capabilities such as inflight refueling were developed. Equip-
ment, such as fuel bladders, were deployed. And most importantly, the culture throughout the 
Corps had been shaped to create a more SOF-like attitude, rather than a “storm the beach and 
catch bullets” attitude.
Wikipedia states that the purpose of the nuclear triad is “to significantly reduce the possibility 
that an enemy could destroy all of a nation’s nuclear forces in a first-strike attack; this, in turn, 
ensures a credible threat of a second strike, and thus increases a nation’s nuclear deterrence.” Re-
alizing a need in the short, medium, and long terms to create effects that can deter an adversary 
(or adversaries), a new triad of capabilities must be developed to keep the Navy, and therefore 
the nation, relevant in global affairs. The new triad is:
• A SOF-like fleet/service. This is about people and culture.
• Unmanned systems (UxS). This is about platforms.
• Cyber. This is about electrons.
The purpose of this new triad—in effect, the future “fleet”—is to significantly reduce the pos-
sibility that an enemy could have a lasting, permanent effect on the global order; this, in turn, 
ensures that the Navy and the nation (and the established global order) remain viable, and thus 
increases our nation’s resilience and deters adversary action.
Additionally, the adversary understands the American preeminence in conventional conflicts. As 
a result, today’s adversary(ies) have developed operations for which the United States govern-
ment either does not have an option, short of response with its conventional forces, or the option 
is politically too costly, in the domestic or international sense. Developing the new conventional 
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triad provides the Navy, and the nation, with the necessary response options to adversaries’ cur-
rent initiatives (see figure 1 below).4
Figure 1. Modern Spectrum of Conflict
Our fleet is configured for that high-end conventional fight. As a result, many of the weapons 
pairings available to the fleet are not cost-effective for employment in less-than-convention-
al conflict. For example, a single SM-6 costs millions of dollars. Combined with the limited 
number of Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells in surface combatants and the competition for 
other weapons, such as Tomahawk, to be available, current surface combatants will not have the 
quantity of necessary effects available. Other solutions, such as directed energy (DE) and rail-
gun technologies, provide affordable solutions that increase the number of rounds available at 
a significantly lower cost per “round,” or firing. Forced to operate in the spectrum of conflict at 
a level that avoids confronting U.S. conventional forces, our adversaries are well aware of our 
weapons costs and are potentially outpacing our efforts to develop DE and railgun technologies. 
This appears evidenced by recent reports that China now has put to sea to test the world’s first 
railgun. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy’s railgun—which was well ahead of China’s only a couple of 
years ago—has been relegated to the storage yards in Dahlgren because of a lack of funding.
Next, consider the fact that the federal government no longer leads the nation in research-and- 
development (R&D) investment. The ratio between federal government and industry investment 
in R&D has essentially flipped, with industry funding over sixty cents of every investment dollar. 
(See figure 2 below.)
 




While there are many implications, for this discussion the salient point is that industry has capa-
bilities that the Navy can leverage. However, this should not be done in the traditional fashion, in 
which the technology or capability is incorporated through Navy processes and brought into the 
fleet, which then goes off to the fight. Consideration should be given to making industry’s R&D 
leaders partners in the fight. Some of those in American industry consider themselves to be in the 
fight already, and they have learned lessons, developed their own TTP, etc. Going into conflict 
with industry as a partner presents challenges with regard to authorities and access to informa-
tion, but those challenges are not insurmountable.
Attributes we (should) value:
• Agility







5. “U.S. R&D Increased by More Than $20 Billion in Both 2013 and 2014, with Similar Increase Estimated for 
2015,” National Science Foundation, September 15, 2016, https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2016/nsf16316/.
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Assumptions/weaknesses:
• No Cold War Navy environment
• Homeland defense is of key importance
• Technology is changing rapidly
• Navy personnel system is broken
• Navy does not manage talent well
• Navy does not value education
• Poor/traditional investment strategy
• U.S. dominance is an illusion
• Navy lacks interest in new technologies
• Commercial R&D is dominant
• There is a distinction among autonomy, unmanned, and artificial intelligence—and it is not 
understood
• AI is not present in today’s Navy
• Future engagements will look like SOF operations
• Plan on being surprised
• <3% of GDP will be spent on defense
Other points to consider:
• The fleet is a system
• Every ship is a node
• Trends should be toward more/smaller/distributed
• Combat system shouldn’t know or care where the lifelines are





(traits current SOFs exhibit 
that we need in the fleet/ 
institution
To Be
(traits the future fleet/ 
institution should adopt 
from SOFs)








• Phases 0, 1 & 5
• Multidimensional
• Higher acceptance of risk
• Q-ships
• Planning process
• In plain sight
• Focused/precision effects
• {May not be big bang}




As Is To Be How Do We Develop?
• Mostly commercial
• Rigid acquisition process
• Entrenched PORs resist new 
ideas
• Plentiful







• Need prototype process
• Evolve or die
• Change acquisition process
• Buy as commodity
• SCN: No
• Virtual/mixed reality & 
gaming
• Training & experimenting











• Offensive: platform agnostic
• Defensive: every platform & 
system
• Unclear C2 & integration of 
effects
• Ubiquitous (Red & Blue)
• Supply chain vulnerability
• Decomposable
• Ability to operate in cyber 
environment




• Change in C2 structure
• Joint
• Game & exercise




• Establish a cross-Navy strategic/asymmetric thinking unit to address the new conventional 
triad to assess execution across programs
• Ensure the Force Structure Assessment implements the new conventional triad (deepen N9I)
• Develop a coherent strategy for the development and employment of the new conventional 
triad
• Embrace prototyping, use commercial development, focus experimentation on elemental 
capabilities
• Mandate incorporation of cyber threats into all wargaming scenarios
• Increase CRADAs with commercial AI businesses
Medium-term effects:
• Integrate UxS as an integral element of distributed maritime ops (DMO)
• Value the fleet as a connected/connectible entity that is able to sense, understand, affect, and 
adapt
• Integrate capabilities, fully develop TTP, enable prototype transitions, protect from large 
PORs
• Mature AI (wargaming)
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Long-term effects:
• Future state: Conventional triad fully integrated as elements of a connected/connectible fleet
Conclusion
The single greatest obstacle to developing the new conventional triad—the thread that can be 
found in the decisions that brought us to the current reality and that prevent addressing project-
ed future conflict—is the inflexibility of the Navy’s institutional resource-allocation process. It 
prevents agility in acquisition processes, in developing and resourcing an essential and modern 
continuum of education, and in realizing potential cost efficiencies available through partnership 
with commercial efforts.
This must change. It must change for us to create an institution with the flexibility and agility 
necessary to resource a future fleet that is more SOF-like, integrated with UxS, and cyber-resilient 
and -capable.
PNWC Remarks
The conclusion corresponds to Under Secretary Modly’s call for a focus on agility. A more agile 
resource-allocation process—one that is adaptable, collaborative rather than contested, and that 
promotes innovation—could use an iterative process to institutionalize “radical” change. If 
we are to be successful, change cannot be avoided. However, it need not be so disruptive as to 
require efforts at mediating collateral damage to combat-proven practices. The goal of “radical” 
thinking should include an examination of how best to implement the change, in such a way that 
it seems a natural evolution in capabilities. To some extent, the increase in SOFs that has oc-
curred since 2001 does constitute a radically different approach to global capabilities, but it has 
been carried out in a way that appears to increase overall conventional capabilities. To slightly 
modify a traditional Chinese proverb: “About the best changes, we will say, ‘We did them our-
selves.’”
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Working Group #3 Membership:
Chair: VADM Mike Franken, USN (Ret.)
Rapporteur: Dr. Robby Harris
Recorder: CAPT Adam M. Aycock, USN








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Organizing for National Defense
Background
The National Security Act of 1947 restructured U.S. military and intelligence agencies after 
World War II. The Act, since amended, combined with appropriations laws and other processes, 
has provided for ongoing changes to the overall national security organization. 
There is substantial literature that considers the depth, breadth, and complexity of forecasted 
threats to national security and the internal challenges the national security organization faces to 
meet those threats effectively. Rather than adding to that considerable volume of work, the group 
focused on exploring a few key practical changes that would better serve not just the military, 
but the whole of government’s national security efforts. While these changes may not seem bold 
individually, implementing them would serve to break the mold of the current national security 
construct, enabling unified, comprehensive delivery of U.S. national power and influence.
The Issue
While the National Security Strategy informs the National Defense Strategy, which in turn 
informs the National Maritime Strategy as well as the other service strategies, the bureau-
cracies created to execute these strategies and responsible for doing so—thereby providing 
whole-of-government solutions to address national security concerns—are not geographically or 
operationally aligned and synchronized. The development of effective whole-of-government re-
sponses is impeded further by overlaps in responsibilities and authorities, resulting in duplicative 
tasking, and sometimes gaps in roles and missions.
Issues that prevent developing, resourcing, and effectively and efficiently executing a unified 
national strategy include:
• An integrated strategy process that is not consistently aligned with budget development
• Agencies that lack the experience and relationships to integrate planning and execution
• An acquisition system that is unable to respond to anticipated and rapidly emergent threats in 
a timely and cost-efficient manner
• Lack of responsiveness owing to inadequate inter- and intraagency coordination and collabo-
ration
• Poorly aligned regional responsibilities that impede suitable coordination and dynamic re-
sponse across the seams
• A dire need for Congress to allow the national security apparatus to become more agile and 
adaptive in providing timely responses to highly dynamic and complex threats; this requires 
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appropriately increased levels of flexibility and decision authority
• Overcentralized logistic/sustainment processes that are inadequate to sustain responses to 
highly dynamic and complex threats
• An inadequate long-term strategic assessment/planning process that fails to guide, shape, 
change, and transform the national security apparatus at the rate necessary to address antici-
pated and emergent future threats
Since it is impossible to address all these (and additional) issues in any one workshop, the group 
focused on generating a select group of ideas that would contribute to overall improvements in 
the national security organization.
The Questions
What ideas would contribute to the development of an agile, whole-of-government decision-making 
process that would align strategy/policy/budget against a common understanding of national 
security threats; to the development of an acquisition/procurement/deployment process responsive 
to these strategies; to the development of a cost-effective sustainment/maintenance process sup-
porting implementation of these strategies; to the development of whole-of-government delivery 
of American power; and to the development of a workforce capable of these crosscutting roles/
tasks? Additionally, how can the national security complex evolve to meet these needs and the 
demands (threats and opportunities) of a new global environment?
Discussion
The bureaucracies responsible for national security have matured and grown over the course of 
70 years. However, the original goals of the National Security Act of 1947—(1) breaking down 
compartments, (2) allowing for a comprehensive understanding of the threat environment (“the 
big picture”), (3) providing centralized leadership, and (4) preventing duplication and improving 
communication—have not been realized. Recognizing this after the war in Vietnam and some 
small-scale conflicts, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DoD) 
Reorganization Act in 1986. While the act did improve operational military effectiveness—as 
demonstrated in 1989 during Operation Just Cause in Panama—its effect was limited to the 
armed services in DoD. The previously discussed issues concerning the bureaucracies responsi-
ble for national security remained extant, and in some cases became increasingly problematic.
While the military services were reorganized and interservice rivalry was reduced (though not 
eradicated), the DoD bureaucracy continued with business as usual and its interaction with the 
other bureaucracies remained weak. It is therefore a poor assumption that the DoD “has it right.” 
Forced to improve by Goldwater-Nichols, the DoD does stands out from the other bureaucracies 
responsible for national security. However, the appearance of relative effectiveness in DoD can 
be attributed as much to the ineffectiveness of the rest of the national security apparatus as it can 
to Goldwater-Nichols.
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The issues previously identified are certainly not unknown and they are not isolated to the U.S. 
government’s national security organization. The U.S. government’s overall acquisition system is 
widely acknowledged to be inefficient in comparison with the private sector’s. However, the na-
ture of the congressional system and the impact of government spending on individual congres-
sional districts obviously makes any change in organization and acquisition a political debate. 
Bluntly, everyone understands the preeminence of the election cycle and its negative impact on 
developing a comprehensive and coherent national strategy. Reforming the system remains a 
permanent challenge—but that does not mean such reforms should not be attempted.
Our conclusion is that the present “fragmented government” approach, particularly with respect 
to the national security apparatus—which won the Cold War—is not currently capable of effec-
tively preparing for or responding to future threats. Fundamental changes can create a different 
reality.
Recommendations
Concept 1: Create an Integrated National Security Strategy
Goal: Develop an integrated, whole-of-government national security strategy based on a national 
security threat analysis, aligned with a unified national security budget to support the integrated 
security strategy.
Problem: DoD, State, Treasury, Homeland Security, and other national security–related agencies/
organizations submit separate budgets that are not aligned to a unified threat analysis or a unified 
national security strategy, so they create overlaps and inefficiencies, and even missed missions. 
Congress authorizes, appropriates, and provides oversight to each budget in a similarly frag-
mented way, preventing holistic budgeting and oversight. The result is the lack of a unified USG 
approach to national security. Such difficulties became particularly apparent during the interven-
tions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even when there is an effective interagency, integrated strategy 
process, absent direct intervention by individual congressmen, any new requirements identified 
by the strategy may have to wait as long as two years to get funding through the current budget 
process.
Impediments: Agency/service/congressional committee stovepipes that are incentivized to pre-
serve bureaucratic equities.
Solution: Create an integrated national security strategy based on a whole-of-government threat 
analysis, supported by a unified national security budget—all through a process managed by the 
president’s national security advisor.
Concept 2: Institute a “National Security Service” (NSS)
Goal: Facilitate a solution-oriented, interagency decision-making and national power–delivery 
process. Codify a career process that promotes maximum interagency knowledge and experience 
and fosters cooperation between personnel assigned to different agencies.
Problem: Difficulties exist in comprehensive interagency coordination and unbalanced resource 
allocation between DoD and all other national security agencies, particularly State.
Impediments: Agency/service resistance to giving up control over resources. Lack of interagen-
cy personnel training.
Solution: Create NSS and encourage personnel to have at least one tour in an agency other than 
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their own. Tours in other agencies should be career-enhancing, with expanded opportunities for 
multiple interagency tours. Goldwater-Nichols is the inspiration for this proposal. This solution 
will provide a breadth of understanding of whole-of-government power, resources, and processes 
to senior leadership, particularly political appointees.
Concept 3: Create Regional Interagency Authorities
Goal: Integrate the delivery of U.S. power and influence abroad using a regionally aligned, inter-
agency structure combining DoD and non-DoD agencies.
Problem: At present, implementing integrated U.S. strategy is ineffective and is characterized by 
overlapping efforts, often poorly coordinated; unbalanced resources; and lateral communication.
Impediments: Institutional resistance; international concerns regarding intent and interoperabili-
ty with counterparts.
Solution: In lieu of combatant commands and civilian-agency outposts, regional interagency 
authorities (RIAs) should be established with a pyramidal leadership structure: (1) a senior civil-
ian head, with deep regional experience, ideally NSS-trained; (2) a military deputy (formerly the 
combatant commander), with direction and coordinating authority over U.S. military actors in the 
region; and (3) a civilian deputy with “regional ambassador” status who has coordinating author-
ity over country ambassadors and other civilian organizations operating within the region (e.g., 
Homeland Security, Treasury, Justice, Commerce, and the like). A possible interim step toward 
this solution (if there is insufficient consensus on establishing the RIAs) would be the appoint-
ment of a civilian deputy to the COCOM who would be responsible for all Title 22 and Title 10 
security assistance and cooperation programs in the region.
Concept 4: “Develop National Security” SES/Flag Officers
Goal: Develop well-rounded senior DoD leaders capable of integrating whole-of-government 
approaches to solving regional and global security challenges.
Problem: Few senior leaders have the experience to effectively coordinate interagency solutions 
or manage interagency organizations/processes. The Goldwater-Nichols Act did not incorporate 
provisions concerning interagency cooperation.
Impediments: Current service personnel career-path requirements impede interagency interoper-
ability to support whole-of-government solutions.
Solution: An alternative career path should be established that allows selected flag officers to 
serve as national security leaders in joint and interagency environments. This would constitute an 
effective adjunct to the proposal to institute an NSS, or the possible interim measure.
Conclusion
As the Goldwater-Nichols Act improved U.S. military effectiveness, allowing it to become the 
most joint, lethal, and respected military in the world, so can and should improvements be made 
to the overarching national security apparatus as a whole to sustain America’s preeminent super-
power position. This must be done to enable the full extent of American power to be brought to 
bear in a fully coordinated, effective, and agile way in addressing the increasingly formidable 
threats of the future, both known and unknown.
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PNWC Remarks
Group 4 deliberately adopted a step-by-step approach to organizational change, not because 
“breaking the mold” is not needed, but because amending the National Security Act is within 
the purview of Congress, not DoD. However, the group explored how the Navy, the DoD, and 
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Remarks by Thomas B. Modly
Under Secretary of the Navy
Naval War College
Breaking the Mold Conference
March 7, 2018
Thank you for the kind introduction, and thank you for the honor of addressing you today at 
this appropriately titled “Breaking the Mold” conference. I recognize that the path each of you 
has taken to be included in this audience today is unique, but also remarkable and worthy of 
great pride and recognition. I also know that there are common threads among you or else you 
wouldn’t be here: a love for YOUR country, a love for YOUR Navy, and an intellectual and 
emotional passion for helping us get it right as we consider what national and maritime security 
will mean in this new century. My own active-duty career in the Navy was relatively short, but 
I have a profound appreciation for, and connection to, those of you who started along this path 
around the same time I did in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Whether on active duty, as a Navy 
civilian, or even in the private sector, we have all witnessed profound changes together during 
the past four decades. These changes will impact the U.S. Navy and our nation for years to come. 
The changes are coming at us fast—so we need to be prepared to break free of the organizational 
paradigms, and behaviors, and biases that suited us in the last century. They are not well-suited 
for today, and certainly not for the future.
When we were first confronted by terrorism on a massive scale on 9-11, many people realized 
that perhaps simply “cracking the mold” was necessary to shift our focus and forces onto a new, 
unconventional adversary. We actually adapted our tactics and capabilities quite well to address 
this threat militarily, and we continue to assess and adjust how we can defeat them in the new 
battle spaces of social media and ideology. After sixteen years of war with this type of adversary, 
however, I think that simply “cracking the mold” may not be enough, because no longer are we 
faced with a single rogue terrorist actor; rather, today we are faced with a broad and varied spec-
trum of them. We see this across every area of the world in which our naval forces must engage. 
These transnational actors inspire each other and use the tools of modern technology and social 
media to build connections across borders that threaten our people and our allies and friends 
around the world. Some of them are actually states, like North Korea and Iran, who have recog-
nized that their paths to survival are through an ascendance to great-power status of their own 
making. They both have chosen to do so by directly and indirectly confronting the United States 
in order to demonstrate our vulnerabilities, and in return to elevate their own prestige.
More alarming, though, in recent years we have seen changes that have eclipsed the dangers 
these rogue actors, and rogue nations, have presented over the past decade. If you have read 
our new National Defense Strategy, you will see this emerging challenge clearly articulated. Its 
implications are alarming, and rightly so, and they will drive investments in our defense capabili-
ties going forward. We are entering an era of great-power competition on global scale, and so we 
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must be focused on responsibly developing forces that protect our people and our interests, and 
our friends and allies around the world.
The National Defense Strategy is a very cogent and realistic document. It is aligned with the 
National Security Strategy of the United States, which was published just a few weeks before 
the NDS, and it very plainly directs the Department of Defense to Compete, Deter, and Win 
alongside our allies and partners. It is a strategy that recalls President Reagan’s commitment to 
preserve peace through strength, while enabling decisive victory in conflict if necessary. It is the 
department’s preeminent strategic-guidance document, and it will set the course for the Depart-
ment of the Navy for years to come.
As the strategy describes, great-power competition has reemerged as the central challenge to U.S. 
security and prosperity, and this geostrategic fact is demanding prioritization and tough strategic 
choices. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their 
authoritarian model, and they will use whatever tools that are available to them, both lethal and 
nonlethal, legal and illegal, to gain influence and authority over other nations’ economic, diplo-
matic, and security decisions.
Both China and Russia aim to shift the regional balances of power to their advantage. It is their 
stated intent to weaken or fracture the U.S.-led alliance and partnership network that has ensured 
security and prosperity for so many around the world. If unaddressed, the erosion of the United 
States’ military advantage vis-à-vis China and Russia could undermine our ability to deter ag-
gression and coercion in key strategic regions. Therefore, we must correct the trajectory of the 
past several years so that both countries understand that the United States is not in retreat, but 
that we will advance our interests and influence around the world. Those interests are primarily 
defined by actions that will promote global peace and prosperity, through what Secretary Mattis 
describes as a “Constellation of Partnerships” with nations who share our values and security 
interests.
While the strategy prioritizes the challenges from China and Russia, it does not ignore the grow-
ing and pervasive threats from North Korea and Iran, and it also continues our commitment to 
defeat violent extremism and the horrors being perpetrated in the name of Salafist-based ideol-
ogies. In essence, it is a realistic strategy, but also a very ambitious one that cannot be executed 
without a significant commitment of national resources and, perhaps more importantly, a signif-
icant application of national resolve and urgency—and an approach to maritime supremacy that 
“breaks the mold” of conventional thinking.
As Secretary Mattis has stated, “In a world awash in change and increasing threats, there is no 
room for complacency. History makes clear that no country has a preordained right to victory on 
the battlefield.”
The Secretary is certainly correct that there is no preordained right to victory. Rather, it occurs 
when a nation is prepared not only for the fight that it sees coming, but also when it is prepared 
for the fight that it does not. So it follows that the NDS is structured to address the full range of 
adversaries we may face in this rapidly changing security environment. The future joint force 
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must be lethal and resilient in contested environments, disruptive to adversaries who seek advan-
tages across the globe, and flexible enough to address and defeat threats across a broad conflict 
spectrum.
Fundamental to this future force will be the preeminence of our maritime superiority because 
America is, and will always be, a maritime nation. Command of the seas is central to our nation’s 
security and prosperity, and our maritime forces continue to be in great demand around the globe. 
China and Russia are heavily investing in expanding their conventional and unconventional na-
val capabilities, and Iran and North Korea present challenges to our naval forces in different, but 
still very disruptive and dangerous, ways.
Therefore, given the increasing complexity of the competitive geostrategic landscape, the Na-
tional Defense Strategy’s mandate for how we construct our naval forces must address a broad 
range of competing challenges:
• A return to great-power competition, but not to the exclusion of other threats.
• An emphasis on lethality and readiness, but not to the exclusion of new platforms and tech-
nologies for the future fight.
• A recognition that we must advance our nation’s interest and influence on the seas, but not 
to the exclusion of building alliances and partnerships that seek peaceful conflict resolution, 
with preparedness for the use of decisive force if necessary.
So what does this mean for you as think about how to break the mold of old paradigms and ways 
of thinking? In a word, I believe that breaking the mold will require a preeminent focus on the 
need for agility. Agility is the term that I believe best describes the overall organizational quality 
that has determined, and will determine, who and what survives in any increasingly competitive, 
rapidly changing, and unpredictable environment. This is the environment our Navy faces today, 
so I think we will ultimately be judged by how well we transition our forces and our supporting 
organizations to a future in which agility is their defining characteristic.
Therefore, we must advance agility when we think about and build our future force structure. We 
need more ships and aircraft and vehicles, but that equipment must provide flexibility, adaptabili-
ty, faster development cycles, reduced maintenance requirements, greater lethality, and an indus-
trial strategy that sustains a modern, flexible, and sustainable industrial base.
We must also advance agility in how we manage the business mission of the department. We 
must have faster access to accurate information and we must reduce the overhead and bureaucra-
cy that impedes rapid decision-making. We must also understand the difference between being a 
smart buyer and a bad customer. We cannot build and maintain an agile organization if we pro-
mote an adversarial relationship with industry. Rather, we must promote competition, but with 
integrity, transparency, and collaboration around common interests.
Most importantly, we must advance agility when we think about our people. We need to recruit 
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and train people who are innovative and creative and courageous. People who are comfortable 
with uncertainty and who can collaborate and trust their teams and leaders under stressful condi-
tions. We must also tap into the vast knowledge and spirit of the private sector as partners with 
our men and women in uniform, as well as our civilian workforce.
While I believe we would all agree that the Navy needs to become more agile in all the areas I 
just mentioned, I also think we would all agree that defining and, even more importantly, mea-
suring agility is not a simple task. For most of us, agility is not unlike Supreme Justice Potter 
Stewart’s famous statement about pornography. In commenting on the definition of pornography 
and how it related to a particular movie that was at the center of a Supreme Court case, Justice 
Stewart said, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced within that shorthand description, and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly 
doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”
I suspect that most of us could paraphrase this and say, “I shall not attempt to define what is 
embraced in the term agility. But I know it when I see it, and many of the things the Navy does 
today are not that.”
But we shouldn’t despair. There are some very concrete organizational qualities we can truly ob-
serve and measure to determine whether we are building and leading a more agile organization. I 
would like to offer five of these qualities for your consideration. This is not a comprehensive list, 
but I do believe that, if nurtured, each of these organizational qualities will contribute to a more 
agile Navy—and as we progress in building and encouraging these qualities, “we will all know 
when we see it.”
The first of these qualities is velocity, or speed. In a time of rapid change, organizations have to 
learn to do things faster. Every major enterprise that has emerged as a leader in its respective 
industry over the last 20 years has improved in this area—and often by quantum leaps. When you 
started your careers, think about how long it took to shop for something in a catalog, or to book 
an airline ticket, or to have a package delivered. Think about how long it took to transfer money, 
or just get cash for spending. More significantly, think about how long it took for well-estab-
lished institutions to lose their competitive advantages. Now think about Kodak, or General Mo-
tors, or Sears and Roebuck, or even a more current example of the Internet age, America Online. 
Once the tide and pace of change begins accelerating, it is impossible to stop it. Speed is critical 
to survival in such an environment. For the Navy, this speaks not only to how fast our weapons 
can fly or how quickly we can move forces from place to place, it has much more importance 
with respect to how it characterizes our processes and decision-making. When we look at our ac-
quisition programs, for example, I think we can all agree that our lack of speed when compared 
to commercial industry is clearly costing us money and stifling our ability to incorporate technol-
ogies at the velocity of change. The same applies to how long it takes us to hire qualified people, 
or to move beyond them if they are unable to perform adequately. When compared to some of 
our geostrategic competitors who have discovered ways to shortcut innovation through nefarious 
means or who can more quickly leverage commercially available technology, our lack of speed 
is quickly becoming a competitive disadvantage. In the end, if we don’t correct this trajectory, it 
will end up costing us much more than just money.
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The second quality is adaptability. Agile organizations adapt quickly to changing conditions. 
They do not allow themselves to stagnate or be overcome by changes in their environment. 
Boston Consulting Group (BCG) has studied the concept of corporate adaptiveness and discov-
ered that there are in fact concrete ways to measure a company’s capabilities in this regard. Not 
surprisingly, when examined within competitive environments that are defined as particularly 
“turbulent,” the most adaptive companies on the BCG index far outperformed those who were 
lower on the scale. This conclusion seems obvious, but the overarching point of this work was 
that a high adaptability score for such companies did not come by accident. Rather, those compa-
nies who successfully built adaptive organizations did so intentionally and invested in it com-
mensurately. For us, this means that we must consider and invest in adaptability across the entire 
Navy enterprise. We must foster flexibility in our people, design and construct both adaptable 
platforms and force-deployment models, and ensure that both people and platforms are enabled 
by flexible business and operational processes. We must also encourage an understanding of the 
world and the geopolitical context in which we ask our forces to deploy. Our people must be 
able to adapt to the multiple potential environments in which they may be asked to operate—and 
fight. They cannot afford to be ignorant of them.
The third agility quality is collaboration. Collaborative cultures may appear to be on the opposite 
end of the spectrum from bureaucratic ones. This does not have to be the case—and we cannot 
allow it to be the case in our Navy. I have often observed that the Department of Defense, like 
most great bureaucracies, is the great “self-siloing” organization. It tends to have an aversion to 
working across organizational boundaries, and organizations and suborganizations have a bias 
toward protecting themselves—along with their domains, their budgets, their identities, and their 
hierarchies—fiercely. Some of this is to be expected in a culture that is inspired historically by 
a traditional military command and control environment, but some of it also leads to unhealthy 
behaviors that inhibit collaboration and resolutions that are in the best interest of the entire enter-
prise. Our propensity for siloing is perhaps one of the most difficult cultural challenges we have 
to overcome—but we have to overcome it. Agile organizations collaborate across internal and 
external boundaries, and most importantly up and down the chain of command. This collabora-
tion fosters a greater enterprise appreciation of the organizational strategy, and encourages great-
er enterprise-focused solutions that are not simply optimized for a particular suborganization, 
command, ship, SYSCOM, or program. This means that leaders in our Navy, whether they are 
military or civil servants, must set very high standards for collaboration, openness, communica-
tion, fairness, compassion, intensity, and commitment if there is any hope of impacting culture in 
a positive way that enhances overall agility. Leaders must demonstrate zero tolerance for orga-
nizational silos and an aversion to the accumulation of power, while building broad coalitions 
that align resources and momentum in a common direction. Fostering greater collaboration as a 
critical cultural characteristic will also help us improve our ability to work with allies and part-
ners around the world whom the NDS identifies as critical to our ability to secure our interests.
The fourth quality of agility on my list is visibility. This is a key element, as it exists in all or-
ganizations that move quickly, adapt, and share information freely. These organizations allow 
for the best authoritative data available to drive decisions. For us in the Navy, this has as much 
applicability to a theater of maritime operations as it does to the back office. The proliferation of 
platforms with sensors, and our ability to integrate and understand all the data they produce, will 
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be critical to the success of the future war-fighting mission. But all this data has to make sense, 
and we must figure out how best to exploit visibility to the right level and at the right time so that 
we increase both our lethality and our ability to defend ourselves.
The same organizational value of visibility holds true for our business environment—and in this 
regard I will put it quite simply: We need to know where all our stuff is, and we need to know 
how much it costs, and we need to know how long it is going to take to get it where it needs to be. 
Today, I don’t think anyone in our organization can answer those questions with a high degree 
of confidence. In the future, however, lots of people in our organization will be required to do 
so. This is why the financial audit effort is such a high priority for me, and why it is so critical 
to the entire enterprise. The financial audit, despite its name, should never be viewed as solely a 
finance-driven effort. Rather, it is an enterprise imperative, because the corrections in visibility, 
accountability, and overall enterprise behavior will accrue to our war-fighting mission directly.
The fifth quality of agility is innovation. Agile organizations are adept at and comfortable with 
trying new things—with experimenting, failing, measuring, and trying again—all with a view 
toward finding new solutions to current and anticipated problems. For those of you who have not 
read it, but who have an interest in understanding how the breakthrough innovation of manned 
flight happened in the last century, I commend to you the Wright brothers biography written by 
David McCullough. The Wright brothers’ story is remarkable. It is great history, but it is also 
a pure innovation case study. Even though this occurred over one hundred years ago, Orville 
and Wilbur Wright demonstrate that innovation is driven by constant trial and error, meticulous 
documentation, and the deliberate construction of a culture of learning. We need a “learning 
culture” in the Navy. We must embrace this as a core value. As many of you know, Ex Scientia 
Tridens is the motto of the Naval Academy. Those words, roughly translated, mean “Through 
Knowledge, Sea Power.” As we think about innovation and its role in the future of our Navy and 
Marine Corps, no words seem more relevant than these. While we surely must invest in more 
ships, aircraft, submarines, armored vehicles, and new missile systems, nothing will be more im-
portant than the investment we make in knowledge—and on creating a force made up of people 
who thirst for it. Rapid technological advances are driving the raw technical requirements for this 
mandate, but knowledge is not purely defined by technical competence. For knowledge to truly 
produce sea power, we must create a culture in the Navy and Marine Corps that is committed to 
learning as a lifelong process—and a lifelong passion. Such a culture is not defined merely by 
certificates or degrees accumulated at regular career intervals, but rather it encourages innovation 
and risk taking and produces sailors and Marines who are prepared to excel in circumstances that 
are characterized by uncertainty, and by adversaries who are unpredictable.
This last quality has specific implications for this institution and the other educational institutions 
across the Navy, such as the Naval Academy, the Post Graduate School, and the Marine Corps 
University. We must break the mold with respect to how we think about the role of education in 
the career progressions of our sailors, Marines, and officer corps. In this regard, we are at a point 
in history not unlike that which was addressed by Captains Ernest King, Dudley Knox, and Bill 
Pye in their seminal report on naval education published in 1920. The report laid the foundation 
for the education of naval officers for years to come, with a greater emphasis on developing offi-
cers with an understanding of strategy, policy, and national security thinking. It is hard to imag-
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ine an agile naval mind that is well prepared for our current turbulent security environment being 
able to lead without these characteristics. Therefore, I am commissioning a comprehensive clean-
sheet review of naval education to determine how well we are educating—not merely training—
our naval forces today, and for the future. While I do not want to presume any conclusions that 
may come from this “Knox-King-Pye Redux for the 21st Century,” I suspect some major course 
corrections are in order, as they are for most every institution that expects to survive and thrive in 
this century. So, as you think about your tasks over these next few days, I ask that you consider 
agility and its components and its implications for the future of naval education when you exper-
iment with what may result when you “break the mold.”
I will conclude by citing one of the many memorable quotes of John Paul Jones, because it 
relates to why agile minds will matter so much in our future Navy. Jones famously said, “Men 
mean more than guns in the rating of a ship.” It loses nothing in the translation when we say, 
“People mean more than weapons in the rating of a service.” Jones’s quote recognizes a profound 
point of truth that is perhaps even more relevant today than it was over two hundred years ago. 
Our maritime advantage is, and will continue to be, almost entirely dependent upon the quality of 
our people. It follows, therefore, that the agility of our future force will be almost entirely depen-
dent upon the agility of the people we identify now to lead it. Therefore, I encourage you to think 
about breaking the mold in a way that allows us to recruit, train, equip, and educate the most 
quick-minded, flexible, collaborative, innovative, and transparent people we can find. If we do 
this, we will set the Navy on the course for maritime superiority well into this century.
The future dictates that our maritime forces will have to contend with something agile, and so we 
must find and develop people who are agile enough to defeat it, and give them more responsibil-
ity. I predict we will have to break the mold to do it, but if we do it will set our Navy, as it sails 




BREAKING THE MOLD—WAR AND STRATEGY IN THE 21st CENTURY
Precepts to the Participants by Dr. Harlan Ullman
Purposes: This conference is intended to begin discussion, inquiry, and examination of how 
“war” may evolve in the coming decades of the 21st century and what strategies might be needed 
to anticipate and respond effectively and within likely resource realities. War is broadly defined 
to include strategic and theater/tactical nuclear, conventional, unconventional, space, cyber, and 
what Russia calls active measures and the United States terms hybrid warfare. Given that this 
conference is only for a day and a half, obvious limitations constrain how much can be covered. 
But the key words are “breaking the mold” in thinking about the future of war and strategies to 
respond and anticipate. The first attachment, on “A Navy the Nation Needs,” is an example of 
how much breaking we would like to do, and an issue list and questions to help guide discussion 
will be distributed shortly.
The crucial guiding and operative principle is to think boldly and creatively about the future, 
with few restraints other than the laws of physics.
This first conference is meant to begin developing a framework for this examination and to raise 
critical questions, including “unknowns” about the nature and character of future war, to stim-
ulate and provoke imaginative, even counterintuitive thinking regarding strategic responses; to 
strengthen the ability for critical analytical thinking and assessment; to create a range of differ-
ent possible strategies for dealing with future war in all its forms, with implications for active, 
reserve, and guard force structure, composition, and levels; operational requirements and deploy-
ments; lethal and nonlethal capabilities; personnel and manning; education and training, especial-
ly in light of the new Defense Strategy that argues that current professional military education 
is “stagnant”; and the organization of national security and defense staffs at headquarters and 
operational levels, including the defense industrial, R&D base; a plan for the regeneration and 
reconstitution of forces; and other issues to be raised. It is a beginning.
Assumptions and Scenarios: The following is meant to bound the first conference with certain 
assumptions and descriptions of the future that by no means are definitive. While these assump-
tions and scenarios define a world more unstable and less attractive than today’s, none of the 
dangers (except an unanticipated environmental catastrophe) are deemed to be existential threats 
to the United States and its allies. We also ask that participants not challenge the assumptions and 
scenarios, as some starting point is needed, and the spectrum is potentially so wide that the entire 
conference could be spent debating each assumption.
The conference will take a “breaking the mold of conventional thinking” approach in applying 
creativity, innovation, and imagination, with the following rules of the game specific for this 
conference (which may be altered for future meetings).
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In the world of 202X:
• No antigravity or other technologically impossible solutions to problems have been invented.
• No major war has occurred between or among the largest/major powers.
• Budget appropriations will continue to be (far) less than is required to maintain the current 
force structure, strategic and operational requirements, and deployments, especially with the 
shift to major-power competition or confrontation as the priorities. Left uncorrected, this will 
produce a hollow force and potentially grave problems for preserving the all-volunteer force, 
especially in light of greater dependence on minority, LGBQT, and other socially directed 
recruiting.
• Power will continue to diffuse, empowering individuals and nonstate groups at the expense 
of traditional states.
• Serious potential threats will continue to arise from nonmilitary and nonkinetic sources, to 
include “active measures”; cyber; creative use of economic and mercantile policies; intimi-
dation; misinformation, propaganda, misdirection, and interference in domestic politics from 
external sources; and more innovative use of military power to achieve political objectives, 
from classic messaging (e.g., sailing SSNs close to underwater cables and linkages; arms 
sales; advisors; and demonstrations of military force, such as firing Kalibr missiles from the 
Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean).
• Offensive, precision weapons and C4ISR will tend to dominate defenses, meaning that de-
ception and maneuver will be more critical. So too, logistical and C4ISR networks likewise 
will become more vulnerable.
• Doctrine of most states with advanced weapons stresses the advantage of firing the first shot, 
that is, anticipating an enemy’s actions and striking preemptively. These arguments have been 
highly criticized as too provocative, and in part the history of World War I—in light of the 
premise of “who mobilizes first, wins”—is used to refute this doctrine.
• Failure of nuclear arms talks—INF and New Start—and the U.S. withdrawal from the 
JCPOA with Iran. But modernization rather than an arms race has led to self-imposed limits 
on strategic forces by the United States and Russia. Meanwhile, China has pursued a more 
technologically advanced but still minimum nuclear deterrent.
• Continued erosion in NATO, as certain unnamed but known allies pursue different courses 
and BREXIT distances the United Kingdom from Europe.
• The U.S. political system remains polarized and highly divisive, and growing deficits, along 
with interest rate increases, represent a major, possibly crippling, constraint for the military 
forces.
• No global financial or environmental catastrophe has occurred.
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In general terms, the world of 202X is one marked by the continued diffusion of power and glo-
balization. Qualitatively, the military forces of the United States and several NATO and Asian al-
lies, Russia, and China have become relatively equal in advanced capability, but with significant 
strategic distinctions. Russian forces remain centered on Europe and protection of Russia, with 
small but effective deployments abroad. China’s military remains a high-low mix, with many 
PLA units less well-equipped than others, owing to financial constraints.
The major difference is that nonstate groups and individuals have acquired significant cyber and 
other electronic capabilities, including limited EMP weapons. Meanwhile, India has modernized 
its forces. Pakistan has become more radicalized. The U.S. presence in Afghanistan has been 
minimal and largely antiterrorist-oriented, as power has moved out of Kabul and a ceasefire with 
the Taliban has been in existence for several years.
The Gulf and Middle East remain turbulent. Saudi Arabia has experienced several incidents of 
major violence; Plan 2030 never achieved its objectives. The Saudi-Israeli detente ended when 
Israel renounced a two-state solution. The Gulf Cooperative Council finally expelled Qatar, 
which moved closer to Iran, whose influence in the region increased. With American withdrawal 
from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the embargoes on Iran were fully lifted 
in exchange for continued compliance by the other signatories, increasing the schism between 
Washington and those other JCPOA signatories. While Washington fumed, it had little effect. 
Iran continued to increase its influence in Iraq and signed a joint security treaty with Baghdad.
The Islamic State and other jihadi groups continued to make attacks in the region and gained 
more than footholds in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, several African states, and the Philip-
pines. Much of this activity was based on criminal activities to raise as much money as possible, 
largely through Internet scams and thefts.
NATO finally expelled one member that threatened to leave after claiming NATO no longer con-
sidered it an ally. Other members maintained right-wing governments, and some reduced their 
participation, favoring greater cooperation with Russia.
In the United States, continued growth in deficits and debt forced major cuts in defense and 
national security spending. The active duty force had been cut to under one million, with only 
a selected number of units being deemed fully operationally ready. The economy did not grow 
quickly enough to match the growing debt. As a result, the overall standard of living declined 
and the disparity between rich and poor grew larger. The two political parties remained domi-
nated by more-extreme left- and right-wing positions, and neither party was able to control both 
ends of Pennsylvania Avenue such that one party could govern with a veto-proof majority.
Social media continued to have significant psychological effects on Americans and American 
politics. Ironically, while the under-thirty generation maintained vast social networks, interper-
sonal relations remained relatively minor. Political correctness continued to have an impact on 
society and the military. Recruitment became more difficult as fewer Americans wished to serve 
in uniform. Many who joined did so for specialist assignments such as cyber and AI, while a sig-
nificant minority of those recruited had social, psychological, and personality characteristics that 
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hindered the application of traditional forms of discipline and the exercise of the strict chain of 
command essential to a functioning military. This required major changes within the department 
that continued to demand constant attention, with the media and Congress seizing on incidents of 
maltreatment of minorities.
Key Questions and Issues: First, because the 21st century is profoundly different from the 20th, 
how applicable are the critical terms and concepts from the 20th century, such as deterrence, con-
tainment, suasion, assured destruction, flexible response, and global wars on terror?
The 20th century was largely binary: Allies versus Central powers in World War I, Allies versus 
the Axis in World War II, East versus West, and capitalism versus communism. The world now is 
far more complex, interconnected, and interrelated. How then is war changing, if at all, consider-
ing this massive diffusion of power and a relative equalization of advanced military technology 
in which the United States no longer maintains superiority?
During the Cold War, military deterrence equaled political deterrence between East and West. 
But in the 21st century, military deterrence alone does not equal political deterrence. How then 
does the best Army, Navy, and Air Force in the world defeat adversaries who lack those forces, 
and who instead rely on an idea and terror to advance their interests?
How, if at all, can Russian “active measures,” China’s mercantile strategy of expanding into the 
China Seas, cyber, global jihad, and failed and failing governments that are the major dangers to 
mankind be deterred by military force alone, or at least as the predominant response?
While nuclear proliferation has so far been constrained, what strategic nuclear strategies may be 
appropriate, including a minimum deterrent matched by stronger defenses against nuclear attack 
or threat?
How will the political need for “immaculate war” and minimization of all casualties—not only 
on our side, but with regard to collateral damage and even our enemies—affect war, strategy, and 
the uses of force?
To what degree can autonomous systems and advanced AI compensate for humans, and what are 
the implications for legal, moral, operational, and rules-of-engagement considerations?
Finally, how does war in the 21st century affect how we train, recruit, maintain, and educate the 
military to keep pace with this rapid and continuing change?
What is needed is a strategic and operational concept or set of concepts that takes into account 
these profound differences between past and current realities. A “brains-based approach” to 
sound strategic thinking is one option and is expanded upon below. Redefining deterrence, con-
tainment, and the 20th century tool kit is another. How might this be accomplished?
Second, nonkinetic aspects of warfare may be as important in affecting will and perception as is 
military force. The military does not have full responsibility and authority for responding to these 
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challenges. While the whole-of-government approach is highly touted as a solution, it is, in fact, 
more rhetoric than reality. For example, who is in charge of cyber in the U.S. government?
Russian trolls and bots have made powerful inroads into domestic societies, in some cases shap-
ing opinion. The same incursions must be expected into military domains. How do we respond, 
for example when the Internet is full of false information and disinformation that impugns the 
U.S. military with stories of misconduct, incompetence, and unsatisfactory performance?
Third, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work called for a “Third Offset” strategy, 
largely but not entirely to protect the network and our dependence on connectivity. This offset 
must be expanded in a strategic context. Here, a “porcupine defense” in dealing with Russia is 
one such option, and is defined below. Another is the notion of a strategy to contain potential 
Chinese military expansion within the first island chain, with the provocative name of “a mobile 
maritime Maginot Line that cannot be outflanked” (realizing that the Maginot Line was never 
breached frontally); this concept is also defined below.
A further option, put forward by Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), now dean of the Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, calls for greater reliance on special forces, cyber, and 
UVs, all broadly defined. How might this be implemented?
A last option is a strategy based on redefining the National Security Act and Unified Command 
Plan, along with reconstitution and regeneration of forces in which a smaller but highly ready 
active-duty force would be dependent on a larger reserve or cadre component that could be mo-
bilized when needed. What might these strategic options entail; what basic assumptions would 
undergird each; what would be the strengths and weaknesses; how would the entire defense and 
manpower base support each; and would each be affordable, given the reality of the resources 
available?
Finally, in all our thinking, we should consider how to turn adversarial strengths to weaknesses 
and our weaknesses into strengths. Winning or exploiting the cost-exchange ratio is one means to 
accomplish these reversals. The United States so far has spent about $70 billion on counter-IEDs; 
the enemy virtually spent pennies on the IEDs themselves. The same sort of cost-exchange ratio 
applies when we drop Mk 82 iron bombs on terrorists from an F-35 that costs $65,000 an hour 
to operate. How do we force potential adversaries into similar disadvantages without resorting to 
huge expenditures on our side, such as that for SDI—which did not bankrupt the Soviet Union?
For example, if a future Russian operational maneuver group (OMG) is organized along lines 
similar to today’s, it has at least three major vulnerabilities. First, as the North Vietnamese 
learned from the battle of Ia Drang in 1965, “hugging the belt” can defeat U.S. firepower supe-
riority (or its Russian OMG equivalent) by bringing the enemy into such proximity that friendly 
fire poses as much danger to own forces as to the enemy’s. Second, OMGs are hugely dependent 
on lines of supply and logistics. How can these be cut or interrupted? Third, as with our forma-
tions, OMGs are dependent on networks and command and control systems that often restrict the 
exercise of initiative on the part of local commanders. These vulnerabilities and others must be 
understood and exploited.
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The same approach is true for the PLA operating inside the first island chain. While the PLA may 
actually have a porcupine defense of its own for the littorals (and as far out as its DF-21 missiles 
can strike), beyond that perimeter it is vulnerable. This provides the basis for a strategy of denial 
and containment, as noted both above and below.
Similarly, what additional techniques can be used to take on Islamist radicalism? Kinetic strikes 
have downsides in terms of collateral damage and inciting others to join the cause for reasons 
stemming from revenge, anger, or desperation. This is an area ripe for further investigation.
Finally, how can we reverse the cost-exchange ratio vis-à-vis “active measures”? It may well 
be that in the future active measures will be part of the playbook of all adversaries, from states 
to nonstate groups to individuals. While this may not be primarily an issue for DoD to address, 
DoD does have the resources to play a vital role.
In summary, the diffusion of technology means that a number of states and nonstate groups have 
military capabilities at least comparable to those of the United States. The continuing assumption 
of technological superiority no longer applies, at least with regard to many capabilities. Capabili-
ties for long-range precision strike and the close-in fight, including C4ISR and weapons systems, 
are no longer dominated by the United States and its allies, although in the aggregate NATO and 
non-NATO major allies still maintain the largest forces. However, particularly in AI, China has 
taken the lead.
The conclusion is that no longer can the United States spend its way clear of danger. It must 
think its way out of harm’s way. Hence, a brains-based approach, or something akin to it, is vital.
A Brains-Based Approach to Strategic Thinking: Like Gaul, this concept consists of three 
parts. First, it must recognize that the 21st century is profoundly different from the 20th. The 
world is far more interconnected and interrelated. What happens in one region may, and probably 
will, have profound effects globally. Further, while the 20th century was largely binary in terms 
of war and adversaries (Allies versus Central Powers in World War I, Allies versus Axis in World 
War II, East versus West in the Cold War), today is far more complicated. And the tools and con-
cepts of the 20th century—such as deterrence, containment, and suasion, for example—do not fit 
in the 21st and must be updated.
For example, what does it take to “deter” Russian active measures, China’s mercantilism, and 
the danger of radical Islam? And beyond that, virtually all of the international structures in play 
today—from NATO to the UN, the World Bank, and the G-7—are constructs of the last century.
Second, a brains-based approach must be knowledge-based, to allow and facilitate as complete 
an understanding as possible when determining policy, including whether and when to use force. 
That knowledge must range from the basic aims to an intimate analysis of the adversary; the 
various possible courses of action and the assumptions underlying each; and their consequences, 
including their resource implications, their costs, and an objective calculation of their affordabili-
ty in blood and treasure.
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Third, the aim of a brains-based approach to strategic thinking must be to affect, influence, and 
control the will and perception of the other so as to allow our brains to beat their brains, in part 
by greater innovation, ingenuity, and inventiveness—often called out-of-the-box thinking.
Strategic Options and Scenarios: Against the future described above, three broad strategic op-
tions will be used to focus responses to “war” in the 21st century, and of course on breaking the 
mold of “conventional” thinking. The first strategy is a “porcupine defense,” undertaken in part 
in conjunction with Naval Forces Europe and focused on Europe and Russia. The assumption 
here is that Russia has no interest in attacking NATO directly. Instead, Russia will rely on a com-
bination of military threat, using its modernized conventional forces and its superiority in theater 
and tactical nuclear weapons; “active measures”; political intimidation and interference; and 
economic leverage in energy, including by seeking substantial ownership and control of western 
energy companies through legal business activities.
NATO’s response has been to increase rotational forces’ presence and training exercises, and to 
establish two new commands intended to ensure better awareness of and response to Russian 
actions. Further, NATO has moved to increase its cyber and counter-information capacity. Prom-
ises to increase defense spending have been made; however, it is unrealistic to believe that many 
states will reach 2 percent of GDP spending for defense. And Russia will continue to attempt to 
exploit cleavages within the alliance arising over Brexit, questions of actual long-term U.S. com-
mitment, and a shift of domestic politics rightward in several member states.
The porcupine strategy and defense are built on the concept of making any attempted Russian 
incursion west—however unlikely that scenario may be—extremely costly, while also coun-
tering Russian “active measures.” Indeed, this line of defense is not unlike the fortification of 
Kaliningrad through antiaccess/area denial measures, but using far more unconventional and 
less expensive means.
The Black Sea will provide the test cases for a porcupine defense strategy. Using Romania as a 
specific example, this form of defense would seek to deploy hundreds, if not thousands, of UVs 
across the land, sea, subsurface, and air domains; their purposes would range from providing 
C4ISR, to targeting and destroying, to providing deception and misdirection, to harassing any 
invading troops. The use of underwater UVs to carry antiship and antisubmarine missiles and 
torpedoes that could be predeployed is part of this approach. Long-range strike missiles would be 
deployed as well.
Ashore, protection of Aegis ashore and air defenses would be enhanced, as Romania has also 
bought Patriot. And Constanta, the major seaport, would be expanded in terms of its defenses, 
including the reinforcement of the marine battalion stationed nearby.
Ground forces would be organized into guerrilla-type forces that would be designed to attack 
the logistics and supply lines of any potential attacker, realizing that any likely incursion from 
the east was likely to be sea-based, given the geography and presence of Ukraine as a natural 
land barrier. Infrastructure would be improved to allow reception of deployable air forces and 
other units from allies in times of crisis. And of course, countering active measures is central. 
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Participants will be asked to expand on these concepts and ideas.
Despite the unfortunate associations of the name (and noting that the Maginot Line in fact was 
never breached, but was outflanked), a mobile maritime Maginot Line that cannot be outflanked 
will provide the second scenario in Asia. The strategy is based on the concept of containing 
Chinese military expansion to inside the first island chain, using a range of UAVs in all domains, 
with emphasis on submersibles that can be predeployed well in advance, armed with antiship, 
-air, and -submarine weapons. The use of decoys, deception, and misdirection would be exten-
sive. Strike groups would function as a reserve, keeping out the range of China’s DF-21s.
Greater reliance on special forces, cyber, and UAVs will mark the third strategy—which needs 
no further elaboration.
And the final strategy will look at restructuring the foundation for national security, namely the 
National Security Act and the Unified Command Plan, with a comprehensive approach across 
government that includes examining how strategies of regeneration and reconstitution might be 
utilized.
Organization: Four seminars will cover the scenarios noted above. Each will be led by two 
co-chairmen and a rapporteur, whose function will be to identify the most crucial and import-
ant points, observations, and, where appropriate, conclusions, along with any implications for 
“un-stagnating military education.”
Seminar One: Breaking the Mold: A Porcupine Strategy of Defense in Europe
• In this seminar, Romania will be the test case for developing this strategy.
Seminar Two: Breaking the Mold: A Mobile, Maritime Maginot Line in Asia
Seminar Three: Breaking the Mold: Reliance on Special Forces, UAVs, and Cyber
Seminar Four: Breaking the Mold: Reorganizing for National Security
• This seminar will consider the drafting of a new national security act and national security 
organization, to include all branches of government, along with changing the structure of 
the Unified Command Plan and the five-sided organization of the Pentagon (SecDef; OSD; 
defense agencies; the CJCS, JCS, and Joint Staff; and the service secretaries and chiefs.
Handouts on each of the seminars will be distributed well in advance of the conference.
Homework: We ask each participant to bring at least one idea, concept, or hypothesis about 
future war and strategy to the conference and, if possible, to submit it in advance, along with at 
least one crucial question that can help shape our thinking. We also would appreciate it if each 
participant would read the rules of the road noted above carefully so that we do not spend much 




Background Issues and Questions for Each Group: These can be discussed separately or con-
currently, but should be fully considered. Groups are free to add to or expand on this list, which 
is not meant to be fully comprehensive, but merely to provoke further discussion. And the oper-
ative word is “provoke.” We really want to break the mold. We ask, however, that you read the 
background paper first.
What are your best guesses as to how the nature or character of war is likely to change, if at 
all, in the coming decades, and what does this mean for strategy and strategic alternatives?
• Do 20th-century concepts such as deterrence and defense apply to the 21st century? What 
does it take to deter Russia or China or North Korea or Iran, not only from war and conflict 
but to contain their geopolitical and economic aspirations and “active measures”? If war 
comes, is it even possible to defeat Russia or China, and if so what does it take?
• As technology becomes more fungible and available, will the diffusion of power across the 
board offer far greater military capability to smaller states and nonstate actors? Does Moore’s 
Law apply beyond zeroes and ones, greatly reducing the technological lead of the United 
States and its NATO and other allies? Or can the United States and the West maintain their 
technological advantage and superiority?
• Will future defenses overpower offenses in terms of creating more favorable cost-exchange 
ratios, or will the offense give more credence to preemption?
• Will the real increases in the costs of people and advanced weapons systems lead to smaller 
militaries, but will they benefit from reduced costs for low-earth satellites and breakthroughs 
in other technology areas?
• Will the greatest leverage in war reside in advances in knowledge and understanding of battle 
and conflict conditions, somewhat removing the fog and friction—the Bill Owens aspiration?
• Will deception, misinformation, and misdirection become areas for the greatest improve-
ments in lethality and military advantage, as “active measures” become more widespread 
across more militaries?
• Will future wars likely be longer or shorter, and will they be subject to escalation or limitation?
• Will fewer bigger or more smaller platforms and systems dominate force planning, and how 
will the distribution of capability and capacity across all forces—sea, air, special, space, and 
cyber—likely evolve?
• Will the “narrative” gain greater strategic and political value in war and conflict, so much so 
that the “battle of the narrative” dominates outcomes?
• Will the aversion to casualties, collateral as well as military, become a more important factor?
• Will allies and publics be persuaded to support such changes?
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• What may be the reactions and responses of potential adversaries to U.S. strategic changes?
• What does this mean for strategy and strategic options, and for the roles of naval power  
specifically?
• What does this mean for organizing for national security; the UCP; the so-called comprehen-
sive approach across government; and NATO? What might be a more effective organization? 
How might Congress be more intimately engaged? Does intelligence need yet another reor-
ganization?
• What are the biggest unknowns and the biggest ideas, as takeaways?
• What conclusions does this lead to for naval education, given that the Under Secretary is 
launching a “clean sheet” review of these assets?
Seminar 1: A Porcupine Defense
The porcupine defense is based on three assumptions: first, the geography of the Black Sea and 
the Dardanelles; second, the ability of local states, supported by NATO, to bloody badly and 
halt potential aggression and attack, including in the form of active measures; and third, that 
reinforcement and the threat of escalation from NATO provide further deterrent and reassurance 
value. In essence, this is a variant of the so-called antiaccess/area-denial concept, using a more 
active defense that must include counters to active measures, information and electronic warfare, 
subversion, “little green men,” and intimidation.
If Kaliningrad is included as part of Russia, only six NATO states border on or are proximate 
to Russian territory: the three Baltic states; Poland; Norway, at its northern tip; and the United 
States, by way of the tip of Alaska’s Aleutian Islands. In the Black Sea, any Russian military 
action against NATO states—Romania, Turkey, and Bulgaria—must come through Ukraine, 
Georgia, or Azerbaijan, or by sea and air.
This strategy discussion will focus on Romania and the fortifying of its position on the Black 
Sea, centered on Constanta, along with other NATO assets in the region and country. The strat-
egy will concentrate on Russian land, air, and naval weaknesses and strengths; those of both 
the operational maneuver group and active measures; using largely Romanian forces, support-
ed with C4ISR in support of NATO forces. It will concentrate heavily on the extensive use of 
perhaps thousands of unmanned systems; longer-range cruise and other missiles; thousands of 
antivehicle and air munitions, such as Javelins and Stingers; local GPS and less jammable C4I; 
inexpensive, low-earth-orbit satellites; local partisan or guerrilla-like forces; and mobile land/
air quick-response units. The Russian order of battle (OOB) can be taken from the Military Bal-
ance and updated to reflect some time in the future, but with no revolutionary changes.
Constanta will be reinforced with these systems, in conjunction with M-K Aegis ashore and Pa-
triot batteries, the new logistic air base, and the NATO multinational brigade HQ at Craiova, with 
a series of concentric defenses that can reach at least 200 miles into the Black Sea. If Russia were 
to mount a land assault, it would have to do so by invading west through Ukraine, which would 
be costly and time-consuming, given the likelihood of Ukrainian resistance.
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While military options are configured using the above criteria, a broader geopolitical strategy of 
using NATO forces in support is needed, with a time frame of one to two years to develop and 
field the required capabilities, to include the new logistics command. Strategic use of Turkey and 
Bulgaria also must be considered, including possible revision of the 1936 Montreux Conven-
tion—one can argue that the convention is obsolete, given that many of the original signatories 
are gone (such as the Soviet Union, although Russia claims sovereign continuity) and Georgia 
and Ukraine are new Black Sea states.
Seminar 2: A Mobile Maritime Maginot Line in Asia
First, people will object to a reference to the Maginot Line. But the Maginot Line was never 
breached; it was outflanked. This approach will not suffer from that weakness, as the line of 
defense will extend from the Aleutians to Vietnam.
The basic assumptions are, first, geographical; second, a greater dependence on regional states 
and allies; and third, confining Chinese military expansion to the first island chain. Elsewhere, 
this has been called the Archipelago Defense. This strategy turns Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, 
the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia into potential large aircraft carriers and fortresses,—the 
linchpins and foundations for a mobile maritime defense.
To what degree can we fashion a new form of containment strategy using allies and potential 
partners such as Vietnam to put in place air, sea, land, and electronic barriers to a Chinese break-
out? Clearly, the Philippines are an interesting challenge, given the personality of its president. 
Similarly, making greater strategic use of Indonesia poses parallel challenges.
Such a strategy obviously would entail naval and shore-based elements, to include long-range 
missiles, air defenses, and mine capability, and likely would require potential deployments of 
land-based forces to augment local and regional defenses.
The overarching policy would be a variant of the old Nixon Doctrine. The United States would 
provide the strategic capability, assisting and supporting regional states, onto whom more-local 
security responsibilities would shift.
Seminar 3: A New Triad—Greater Reliance on Unmanned Systems, Special Forces, and 
Cyber, Writ Large
Assume that the United States maintains the ability to deploy forces (including deployed joint 
forces) of about 100,000–150,000 on each coast, to cover two contingencies; and the strategic 
nuclear balance is maintained. This strategy would place far more emphasis on special forces, 
increasing their numbers from a total of 82,000 uniformed and civilian personnel to a larger fig-
ure, in part by making regular forces more “special.” The purpose of this emphasis would be to 
provide more capability to conduct counterterror, training-and-assistance, and other missions not 
requiring heavier forces.
Far more reliance would be placed on unmanned systems. Likewise, cyber as well as informa-
tional and electronic-warfare roles would be allocated substantial resources of people and money, 
particularly to counter “active measures.”
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What would be the strategy for this emphasis; what would it say about future war; and what roles 
and missions would it fill?
Seminar 4: Revising the Organization for National Defense
National defense is organized around the 1947 act, as amended, and of course other major legis-
lation, including annual authorization and appropriation laws that have imposed changes on the 
overall organization. However, clearly, the overall organization is huge, redundant, and overlap-
ping; usually too slow in making decisions, and often incapable of providing necessary knowl-
edge and intelligence in a timely fashion; and ill-prepared to cope with the challenges of cyber, 
active measures, and other issues.
It is interesting that the key national security bureaucracies—those of DoD, State, the NSC, the 
DCI, CIA, Congress, Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury—have no common regional 
or functional organizations, meaning that there is large overlap. The Unified Command Plan still 
reflects much of the Cold War mind-set, and the presence of multiple jurisdictions—Africa, for 
example. The problems resulting from these aspects normally are rectified by virtue of particular 
personalities and command relationships—which are not necessarily permanent.
The Pentagon itself has as more key parts than it has sides: the Secretary of Defense and OSD; 
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs, and Joint Staff; the service secretaries and their staffs; combatant 
commands; and defense agencies. Does this organization require major change?
Defense acquisition, despite countless commissions, reviews, and studies, remains too slow, 
bureaucratic, expensive, and cumbersome, and incapable of bringing needed capabilities into 
service on a timely basis.
Assuming we are starting from a clean sheet, and including the necessary players and organiza-
tions as inputs, what might constitute a new national security act and national security organiza-
tion, including the organization of Congress? With Armed Services Committees and a plethora 
of subcommittees and divided jurisdiction over intelligence, money, budgets, homeland security, 
and the like, can anything be done to rationalize this organization?
Finally, what is the strategy for advancing the need for reorganization? Obviously, the narrative 
and means to convince, cajole, or coerce support is vital. The focus must be on DoD and combat-
ant commands; however, understanding the broader makeup of national security is essential to 
any reorganization.
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Attachment 1: Action Plan for a Navy the Nation Needs
Subj: Crash Action Plan for a Navy the Nation Needs
If we are serious about pursuing a more lethal Navy, we need to break the mold of past thinking 
because under those conditions, without a huge and virtually impossible increase in budgets, that 
goal is not achievable, certainly for decades. This means that both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue 
must be given options that extend well beyond the bounds of conventional and traditional think-
ing. If these turn out to politically a bridge too far, then decision makers know that this goal will 
be just that.
Here are a range of options that “break the mold:”
• First, change our maritime strategies and deployments/requirements to include a porcupine 
defense in Europe and a mobile flexible Maginot Line plan in Asia, with clear force-level 
consequences.
• Examine the need for opposed-entry amphibious operations, to create options.
• Shift to a truly high-low mix for ships and aircraft:
 —more, smaller “hunter-killer” combatants of 1000 tons or less; diesel-electric
 —submarines for both SS and SSB; Corsair III tactical aircraft
 —CVLs/sea-control ships with 15–20 F-35s
  —far more UAVs of all classes
 —lighter-than-air ships/blimps
• Buying foreign hulls and using commercial standards, using U.S. weapons and electronics 
systems.
• Relying more on a strategy of reconstitution and regeneration of forces to reduce costs, to 
include placing certain large combatants and even SSNs in a “cadre” status, to be recalled 
when needed—saving ONM costs.
• Placing more reliance on allies and the 1000 ship navy or maritime partnerships to compen-
sate for and complement U.S. needs.
• Placing more reliance on cover, deception, and new ways of doing operational business, such 
as carrier battle decoy groups and other means of deception.
• Having a better narrative. If forming Task Force 355 to emphasize the commitment to grow-
ing the Navy cannot be done, elevate this goal to the highest levels of the Navy and Marine 
Corps.
• Inducing a revolution in naval education to ensure that the naval service is well prepared 
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ADOPTING SWARMING USVs OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS: 
JEUNE ECOLE (“THE YOUNG SCHOOL”) MEETS THE 21st CENTURY
BACKGROUND
• With its layered-defense umbrella of surface-to-air missiles, lethal anti-ship cruise missiles 
(ASCMs), and precision long-range strike, Russia is positioned to deny air and sea lines of 
communication to the US Navy and its allies across the Black and Baltic Seas.
• Simply put, the United States and its NATO allies occupy the weaker position vis-à-vis Russia 
in these waters, and it is time to adopt an approach that recognizes this reality. History may 
provide some insights.
DISCUSSION
• French Vice Admiral Hyacinthe-Laurent-Theophile Aube, one of the fathers of 
late-nineteenth-century France’s Jeune Ecole—the Young School—recognized France’s rela-
tive economic and military weakness vis-à-vis Great Britain. Instead of matching Great Brit-
ain ship class to ship class (i.e., battleship to battleship) and in tonnage, Aube advocated the 
use of emerging technologies, clever tactics, and a large fleet of smaller ships, such as torpedo 
boats, to beat a stronger adversary. Although France never got to test Aube’s ideas out against 
Great Britain, the ideas of the Young School still resonate in asymmetric situations.
• While Iran is not usually seen as a model for emulation, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards 
Corps Navy’s (IRGCN’s) concept of swarming large, multi-mission ships with heavily armed 
watercraft in constricted waterways is worth considering. It would be unwise to ignore the 
real threat that the IRGCN’s arming its small craft with anti-ship cruise missiles, torpedoes, 
rockets and heavy machine guns presents.
• Imperial Japan’s kamikaze planes (and boats) during World War Two, the explosive-laden 
suicide boat attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, and a Houthi suicide-boat attack on a Saudi 
ship off the coast of Yemen in 2017 demonstrate how a weaker, desperate attacker can impose 
serious costs on a stronger opponent. In addition to killing 17 sailors and wounding 39 more, 
the attack on the Cole disabled the ship and cost $250 million to bring back to service (and 
upgrade).
• Rather than having NATO forces conduct suicide attacks during conflict, perhaps the applica-
tion of Yankee ingenuity and technology can play off the old theme. The Israel Aerospace In-
dustry’s Harpy drone—also known as a loitering munition—provides an example of current 
technologies, albeit applied to aircraft. The Harpy’s small size and low radar signature make it 
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difficult for air defense networks to detect and target. It is versatile and can be launched from 
ground or air, and can operate autonomously or with a human in the loop.
• Swarms of small, fast, inexpensive, and stealthy robotic boats/unmanned surface vehicles 
(USVs) armed with ASCMs, torpedoes—or themselves the weapon, kamikaze style—could 
tie down an adversary’s larger ships and drain their resources.
• Numerous automated boat platforms already exist in the U.S. and NATO defense industries. 
Anticipating a GPS-denied environment, systems could operate autonomously and rely on 
stellar, inertial, electro-optical, or infrared sensors, or some combination thereof.
• The boats could be stealthy by minimizing height above the waterline, running the exhaust 
underwater, and having a diminutive footprint by omitting accommodations for human op-
erators. Likewise, the boats could be constructed with low-radar-cross-section fiberglass and 
high-powered commercial-off-the-shelf motors like Latin American “Picuda” (Caribbean 
Spanish for “barracuda”) drug runners.
• The question is not whether the US and/or its allies should adopt such procedures, but rather 
what would provide a balance between regular, peacetime operations (like presence missions) 
and the use of such systems in wartime.
RECOMMENDATION
• Instead of encouraging NATO partners, like Romania, to try to match Russia, perhaps the 
United States should take a page from Aube’s playbook and encourage allies to think about 
larger numbers of inexpensive—but stealthy and extremely lethal—small craft. Likewise, US 
NATO allies may look to tactics and platforms weaker opponents have adopted against stron-
ger adversaries.
Sources:
Martin Murphy and Toshi Yoshihara, “Fighting the Naval Hegemon: Evolution in French, So-
viet, and Chinese Naval Thought,” Naval War College Review 68, no. 3 (Summer 2015), https://
usnwc2.usnwc.edu/getattachment/27c3fc57-01da-4b12-a360-d3e32a27393c/Fighting-the-Naval 
-Hegemon--Evolution-in-French,-S.aspx
Office of Naval Intelligence, “Iranian Naval Forces: A Tale of Two Navies,” February 2017, http://
www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/iran/Iran%20022217SP.pdf
Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, “Iran and the Gulf Military Balance” (working 
draft), CSIS, October 3, 2016, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/161004 
_Iran_Gulf_Military_Balance.pdf
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Post, February 6, 2017; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/02/06/video 
-emerges-of-suicide-boat-ramming- saudi-frigate/?utm_term=.679774a55614
Jeremy Vaughan and Simon Henderson, “Bab al-Mandab Shipping Chokepoint Under Threat,” 
POLICYWATCH 2769, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 1, 2017, http://www 
.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/bab-al-mandab-shipping-chokepoint-under-threat
Chief Journalist David Nagle, “USS Cole Rejoins the Fleet,” Naval Sea Systems Command Public 
Affairs, April 19, 2002, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=1415
“Harpy Air Defense Suppression System,” Defense Update, March 4, 2006, http://defense             
-update.com/directory/harpy.htm
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A FLOTILLA TO SUPPORT A STRATEGY OF OFFSHORE CONTROL
BACKGROUND
Written by Hughes and Kline under the auspices of OSD Office of Net Assessment in 2012, A 
Flotilla to Support a Strategy of Offshore Control proposes an affordable way to increase the 
fleet’s offensive capacity and resilience in the littorals. The report draws on NPS student theses, 
faculty research in the NPS Littoral Operations Center, and outcomes of ten years of Joint Cam-
paign Analysis capstone work. This paper summarizes the report.
DISCUSSION
• A flotilla of small missile corvettes should be a low cost, high reward component of the 
U.S. fleet. It can be designed to be effective in littoral waters and cul de sacs around the world 
in times of cooperation, competition, confrontation, or regional conflict. Squadrons from the 
flotilla can support friends and constrain prospective enemies.
• Squadron tactics should be quickly developed, including experiments with manned-  
unmanned systems operating cooperatively.
• Ships of the flotilla can be deployable in numbers appropriate to existing but often-changing 
geopolitical conditions anywhere but not everywhere. In other words, the flotilla offers much 
greater adaptability than the existing but shrinking fleet of large, expensive, multipurpose 
warships. It is designed to relieve the big-ship component of some littoral responsibilities and 
supplement their capabilities.
• The flotilla component can be built with less than 5% of the SCN budget and, because of low 
manning and maintenance costs, will be easier to maintain forward base than the big ship 
fleet.
• The missile corvettes do not carry expensive defensive missile systems or aircraft, They sur-
vive by point defense, soft kill, stealth, concealment along coastlines, and by blending into 
coastal shipping and fishing boats.
• The feasibility of logistics support, sea worthiness, and deployability has been demonstrated 
in detail but must be tailored to local conditions, region by region.
• As a rough estimate, an affordable flotilla might comprise 64 vessels.
• Detailed ship designs made by Total Ship System Engineering classes at NPS that match dif-
ferent classes of similar vessels in the world’s navies indicate the following characteristics:
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• About 500 tons, costing less than $80 million to construct in series production, with a 15-year 
service life so that new designs can be quickly built to respond to technology advances.
• An affordable monohull with little or no expenditures for stealth properties will result in cor-
vettes with about 30 knots speed and shallow draft.
• Armament is eight Harpoon-sized ASCMs, 24 or more short-range dual-purpose missiles, and 
a 57 mm rapid-fire gun.
• The combat crew is 12 for short-durations offensive strikes, but there are 25 berths for extend-
ed peacetime cruising.
• When a ship is put out of action by a missile, the crew does not do damage control but is 
swiftly taken off by a consort vessel while the damaged ship sinks.
• A strategy of offshore control conducted by squadrons of the flotilla envisions participation 
by Marine and Special Force elements along with search by aerial unmanned vehicles tailored 
for scouting, tracking, and targeting. The result can be offensively oriented air-sea- ground 
task groups deployed at low cost for deterrence, distributable attacks, and survivability in 
dangerous waters.
• The flotilla’s contribution to the U. S. fleet include greater offensive capability, capacity, and 
coverage, greater resilience in contested waters, and more diversified engagement flexibility.
ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS
• A flotilla-size vessel provides the opportunity for early command, and to hone leadership and 
seamanship skills at an earlier rank.
• The flotilla provides a venue for manned-unmanned teaming of MDUSV, LDUSV, and 
manned ships experimentation and operation
• A flotilla offers the opportunity for bi-lateral manning and/or exercises with close allies who 
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SEABED WARFARE AND THE EVAPORATION OF  
SUBMARINE STEALTH
BACKGROUND
• World energy markets will be driven to the seabed to drill on smaller and smaller oil fields, 
and to harvest the vast methane hydrate supplies.
• Supplies of readily accessible and refinable rare earth materials on land are consumed, and 
China exerts greater control over their supplies driving industry and commercial entities to 
the seabed.
• International regimes for handling seabed activities, such as the United Nations’ International 
Seabed Authority, will be only marginally effective. Vast areas of the seabed will become 
feral.
• The Blue Economy will be driven by undersea cables, seabed infrastructure, fish and other 
natural resources, and power generation and transmission
• The Chinese will complete their nearly impenetrable “Undersea Great Wall” encompassing 
the entire ECS and SCS, and most of the SOJ and PHILSEA.
• The proliferation of commercially-developed seabed monitoring systems, ROVs and UUVs 
means anybody who wants to monitor the seabed can do so at reasonable cost. Every seabed 
commercial venture will patrol and protect their facilities.
• Every seabed and undersea system will be enabled by robust connectivity, mostly undersea 
and virtually undetectable, and strong artificial intelligence and machine learning ensembles.
• Much of the ocean, and particularly areas of significant commercial investment and value will 
have seabed systems that can detect large, manned submarines, and even much smaller ROVs 
or UUVs.
• In short, the sea, especially the seabed, will become significantly more important to the health 
of the global economy and more important to the perceived strength of global actors, not just 
nation-states. U.S. undersea dominance will be a thing of the past.
• These changes will impact the U.S. ability to use and own the undersea. The SSN(X) and 
COLUMBIA SSBN will be of marginal tactical and strategic value, respectively, as most areas 




• Historically, the U.S. Navy has operated under the assumption that “playing the away 
game”—being forward deployed—was sufficient to protect and defend U.S. home waters. 
Regardless of the status of the “away game,” the U.S. Navy had to also “play the home 
game” including the home seabed game.
• In addition, when conflict arose regardless of it geographic location, the U.S. Navy has to 
be able to move out of the CONUS homeports, through U.S. home waters out into the open 
ocean unhindered and before it could prepare to fight its way into the away battlespace. Sea-
bed warfare demands the Navy fight its way to the open ocean and continue the fight even 
while adversaries were in the U.S. Navy’s flanks and rear—the CONUS home waters— all 
enabled by seabed capabilities.
• The basic assumption of air and surface supremacy in all of the Navy’s and Joint Forces’ 
planning is invalid in the face of Chinese and Russian capabilities. The experiences of 15 or 
more years fighting near and over Iraq and Afghanistan does not apply in the western Pacific 
and Baltic waters.
• Aviators have to re-learn how to suppress enemy air defenses, and re-learn how to fight in the 
face of a competent adversary—how to take hits and losses, and keep on fighting. Surface 
warriors had to learn how to fight despite being “out-sticked” by longer-range and better-ca-
pability weapons.
• The basic assumption that was used in the design, procurement, and tactical operations of U.S. 
Submarine Force—“owning” the top 1,000 feet or so of the water column ensured undersea 
supremacy anywhere in the world, and allowed the execution of sea denial to surface forces 
everywhere— now invalid, ineffective and wrong, will no longer be useful and will be coun-
terproductive.
• From the end of the first Cold War, the Navy and the Submarine Force “whistled past the 
graveyard,” routinely dismissing out of hand the threat from sea mines.
Nations and commercial entities will routinely map underwater terrain to support their 
interests and activities, usually down to the sub-meter resolution, and covering nearly 85 
percent of the world’s oceans. This level of detail allows detailed planning for and place-
ment of systems and devices on the ocean floor, undetectable and immune from attack.
• The proliferation of commercially developed undersea and seabed systems make them read-
ily available to anyone with even a modest amount of funding. These systems had long ago 
departed being a resource only for a rich nation-state.
• And, non-U.S. militaries and nonmilitary security forces were quick to procure and modify 
the commercial undersea and seabed systems for their uses.
• Some systems will be capable against other seabed systems or other undersea systems. Other 
seabed systems will be designed and deployed to use against surface, air, and land systems—
bringing another cross- or multidomain dimension to warfare. Naval forces will be forced to 
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consider not only the role of seabed and undersea forces in warfare on the seabed and in the 
undersea, but also the role of those forces in warfare on the sea surface, in the air and space, 
and on land.
• The U. S. Submarine Force will have to abandon its assumption that being in the undersea 
made submarines immune from attack from anywhere except in the undersea. The interrela-
tionship amongst the warfighting domains made the cross-domain approaches of Combined 
Arms ASW from the Cold War look like simple arithmetic in comparison to advanced alge-
bra.
• The USN Submarine Force and its other undersea and seabed forces have to prepare to com-
pete—fight—against a bunch of adversaries for every part of the undersea and seabed.
• Three technologies are especially important to making the ocean informationally transparent 
and causing the evaporation of submarine stealth: quantum sensors, neutrino sensors, and 
living sensors.
RECOMMENDATION
The fundamental conduct of warfare in the undersea is changing significantly, and doing so in 
a perfectly predictable manner to include the seabed. This change warrants equally significant 
changes in the forces and systems that will fight in the undersea and on the seabed in the second 
half of the 21st century. The DOD should act now to take up the challenge of being able to com-
pete in the deep undersea and on the seabed.
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AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIPS IN THE SEA-CONTROL BATTLE 
BACKGROUND
Statement of the problem: (1) current U.S. naval forces do not possess the weapons inventory to 
conduct the volume of fire necessary for a high-intensity engagement against a militarily-capable 
regional power in a near sea; (2) such an engagement will require strikes against land-based tar-
gets, reducing the focus available for sea control mission areas; (3) weapons resupply of engaged 
combatants is difficult in a high-intensity engagement without removal of the combatants; (4) 
current fleet size requires deployment of the majority of USN assets to the region of engagement, 
exposing other regions of interest to exploitation; (5) combatants cannot be simultaneously tasked 
with providing protection to amphibious/expeditionary forces.
DISCUSSION
• A low-cost potential solution for increasing deployed weapons volume in either a land strike 
or sea control situation is by installing strike weapons on existing platforms that are not cur-
rently equipped. This would also accord with the concept of “distributed lethality.”
• The Littoral Combat Ship cannot satisfy this requirement without significant increase in 
range, an ability to operate for extended periods at sea, and extensive reconfiguration.
• Given volume, manning, and C2 capabilities, existing amphibious warships (particularly 
LPDs and LSDs) appear the best candidates for such a distributed lethality extension.
• During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy gained practical experience in the installation of box and 
canister launchers on ships, providing them with antiship and land strike capabilities.
• In 1997, the U.S. Marine Corps tested the at-sea employment of “high-mobility artillery 
rockets” (HIMARS) fired from a road-mobile launcher griped to the deck of USS Anchorage 
(LPD-23) against a land target.
• Commandant, USMC has suggested that the HIMARS launcher can be eventually equipped 
with antiship missiles.
• In the open arms market, Russia proposed sales of the KLUB-K system, a missile-launching 
system contained within a standard multimodal container (CONEX) box that can be accom-
modated by most merchant container-ships and griped to the decks of amphibious warships.
• Box, canister, and container launchers—along with the necessary C2—can be added to existing 
ships at a fraction of the cost of back-fitting vertical launch tubes (VLS) or new construction.
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• Although such installations may not provide the more extensive capabilities of CGs/DDGs, 
they can augment fleet capabilities, with CGs/DDGs, E-2Ds, or other airborne system provid-
ing targeting data and midcourse correction directly to the missiles.
OBSERVATIONS
• In order to employ amphibious warships in multi-mission operations, USN and USMC will 
need to overcome ingrained limits to current doctrine concerning the employment of amphib-
ious warships.
• USN surface force will need to overcome existing “tribal cultures” that separate cruisers-de-
stroyers (CRUDES) and amphibious forces and inhibits the multimission use of amphibious 
warships.
• Since the war-at-sea capabilities of amphibious warships that are back-fitted with box/canister 
launchers would be inherently less than those of VLS-equipped CGs/DDGs, an alternative 
method of employment would be for amphibious warships to replace DDGs within other 
COCOM areas of responsibility (AORs) in order to allow the CRUDES force to concentrate 
on an area or crisis. For example, LSDs/LPDs could replace DDGs and perform sea-control 
missions in the CENTCOM AOR in the event of a crisis in the Pacific.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• USN should immediately conduct a series of experiments utilizing existing box/canister and 
land-mobile launchers onboard amphibious warships to determine effective employment, C2 
and tactics in their use in sea-control and land-attack missions.
• Following installation on amphibious warships, USN should proceed beyond the current 
planning and cultural limits to “distributed lethality” and immediately conduct experimenta-
tion, engineering, and tactical studies for employment of box/canister launchers on all USN/
USNS vessels capable of installation (excepting hospital ships).
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ADDING SEA-BASED INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES 
(IRBMs) TO THE U.S. NAVY FUTURE FLEET*
BACKGROUND / STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
• Antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) systems appear to be forcing U.S. Naval surface forces away from 
the littoral regions. Emblematic of that is the (perceived) threat posed by the PLA DF-21D/DF-26 
antiship ballistic missiles. Both missiles fall under the category of intermediate-range ballistic mis-
siles (IRBMs) as defined by the INF Treaty, which covers missiles with a range of 1000–5500 
kilometers (622–3418 land miles). Note: The A2/AD term will be used in this assessment 
because it is a well-recognized acronym with DoD. However, as identified by the CNO, there 
are problematic implications for the term.
• Operations research conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School indicates that naval war-
fare favors the side that can “attack effectively first” (particularly in the missile age), but the 
range of A2/AD weapons exceeds that of U.S. Naval aviation, forcing U.S. Naval air and 
surface forces to operate on the defensive as they comes within strike range. SSN/SSGNs can 
operate within the opponents A2/AD envelope, but the number of the platforms are limited 
and will necessarily be expected to carry out other missions.
• Naval strike weapons that can attack from outside A2/AD range, such as sea-launched cruise 
missiles (Tomahawk) are precise, but not timely, and appear to have limited capabilities 
against mobile and buried/hardened targets. This includes Tomahawks carried on SSN/SSGNs. 
Tomahawk speed-to-target is roughly Mach 0.7. In contrast, IRBMs (such as DF-21/26) can 
achieve post-boost phase speeds of Mach 20 (actual speed-over-ground is somewhat lower).
The relatively slow speed of Tomahawk has been perceived as a weakness in that weapon’s use 
during the war on terrorism (particularly operations in Afghanistan). Although Tomahawk has 
been used against fixed targets, such a terrorist training camp infrastructure, its speed has limited 
its use against real-time mobile targets such as terrorist personnel. This has prompted support for 
a prompt global strike (PGS) system of conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) to be fired from the continental U.S. against terrorist targets. Such a system, however, 
would have serious implications for nuclear arms control and might be considered limited by 
current treaties (START).
• The U.S. Navy currently does not possess a weapon that can conduct prompt strike against 
mobile or hardened targets from outside the A2/AD range of potential opponents. Such 
strikes would rely on carrier aviation or joint assets.
• Current carrier strike aircraft (F/A-18E/F) have an approximate combat radius of 390 nautical 
miles (NM)/722 kilometers (km) without aerial tanking. F-35C rated combat radius is 600 
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NM/1112 km without aerial tanking. Combat radius varies based on weapons load. Cur-
rent per unit acquisition cost of F-35C is estimated at $116 million. [Note: Life-cycle costs 
for manned aircraft far exceeds that of missiles.] PLA DF-21D range is estimated at 780 
NM/1450 km. Extending the range of strike aircraft in the future is possible; older carrier 
strike aircraft had rated unrefueled combat radii in excess of 1000 NM.
DISCUSSION
• A conventionally armed (nonnuclear) sea-based IRBM capability for surface warships and 
submarines holds the potential to out-range the PLA land-based missiles and provide an 
effective counterbattery strike capability, thereby enhancing regional deterrence. The primary 
purpose would be strikes against land targets, but such a weapon could be directed against 
opposing fleet concentration areas. (This statement assumes the existence of sensors and bat-
tle-management systems necessary for effective targeting.)
• There are no arms-control treaties or international laws that restrict the construction and de-
ployment of sea-based IRBMs (whether conventionally or nuclear armed). It is possible that 
development of sea-based IRBMs may facilitate the creation of a future regional arms-control 
regime in similar fashion to those governing nuclear-capable land-based IRBMs and ground-
launched cruise missiles in Europe.
• On 2 November 2017, the U.S. Navy Strategic Systems Program reported that an unarmed 
submarine-launched (intercontinental) ballistic missile (SLBM) was launched from an Ohio-
class nuclear guided missile submarine (SSGN) to test a naval option for the “conventional 
prompt global strike capability.” The use of nuclear-capable intercontinental range SLBMs 
for conventional strike is an alternative that is perceived as problematic for the prevention of 
nuclear escalation. However, it would appear that the capability of launching a conventional-
ly-armed SLBM is similar to the capability to launch a conventionally-armed IRBM.
• A conventionally armed, sea-based IRBM based on the design of the former land-based 
Pershing II missile may be a cost-effective solution in comparison with other technologies. 
IRBMs represent mature technologies that do not require an extensive research-and- devel-
opment cycle. However, engineering a land-based Pershing II-type missile to operate at sea 
would involve technical risk, and many aspects of the effort would require extensive technical 
studies.
• Without extensive technical studies it is impossible to estimate the development and per unit 
costs of sea-based IRBMS. However, a MITRE report provides a per unit cost estimate of 
$15 million. Per unit cost for Pershing II converted to 2017 dollars was $19 million.
• It is conceivable that deploying sea-based IRBMs in deck-mounted box launchers might 
allow their integration in existing U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Naval Service (USNS) ships, 
precluding the need to design specialized platforms.
• It is conceivable that a smaller, sea-based IRBM might be developed using modern digital 
and miniaturization technologies that could fit the Mk 41 VLS launcher.
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• Integration of sea-based IRBM fire control into current naval tactical networks to enable ef-
fective use against real-time targets is difficult (as with other over-the-horizon weapons sys-
tems), but certainly not an insurmountable engineering challenge. There are various methods 
of systems integration; similarly, there are alternative methods of targeting and control.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• OPNAV N3/5 should conduct a study of the effects of including sea-based IRBMs in the fu-
ture fleet in terms of strategic requirements.
• OPNAV N8 should conduct campaign analysis and modeling related to the integration of sea-
based IRBMs into the future fleet architecture.
• OPNAV N9 should initiate discussions concerning the appropriate sponsor of a sea-based 
IRBM program and how such a program would develop across weapons and platform-sponsor 
boundaries.
• Commander, Naval Surface Force (COMNAVSURFOR) should initiate a series of experi-
ments in employing ground mobile missile systems—beginning with relatively small and 
short-range missiles—on USN and USNS ships.
• Commander, Naval Submarine Force (COMNAVSUBFOR) and/or other appropriate under-
sea warfare commands should examine the feasibility of converting Ohio-class submarines to 
conventional IRBM launch platforms, similar to their conversion to cruise missile SSGNs.
• Commander, Naval Air Systems Command should begin preliminary technical feasibility 
studies on the adaptation of Pershing II-type systems for sea launch.
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) should begin preliminary technical 
feasibility studies and analysis of alternatives for sea-basing IRBMs on existing vessels and 
future designs.
* A more detailed analysis of this proposal (including alternatives, costs, and risks) is available as 
NWC Institute for Future Warfare Studies Working Paper #1-17-1a.
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SHIFTING FROM SEA CONTROL TO OCEAN/GLOBAL COMMONS 
CONTROL: PREVENTING PRC GLOBAL MARITIME OPERATIONS
BACKGROUND / STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
• The U.S. cannot achieve sea control in the South China Sea (SCS) without striking land tar-
gets in mainland China (PRC).
‒The primary threats to the U.S. Navy in the SCS are People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
Rocket Forces and land-based tactical aviation, not the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN). The PRC will attempt “to use the land to control the sea.”*
‒PLAN does not need to sortie for the PRC to conduct sea-denial operations in the SCS.
• Neutralization of the artificial islands in the Spratly area can mitigate PLA sea-denial capa-
bilities in the southern SCS, but the volume of PLA weapons likely makes the northern area 
untenable.
• However, the U.S. Navy can conduct sea-denial operations in SCS, ensuring that the PLAN 
cannot operate without attrition, and preventing resupply of the artificial islands.
• Sea-denial capability may be sufficient to deter PRC/PLA regional intimidation.
• Nevertheless, NCA may consider a potentially stalemated conflict within the confines of SCS 
as not in the U.S. interest, ceding de factor control over the SCS in face of the threat of con-
flict.
DISCUSSION
• Although the PRC can achieve denial and possibly dominance in near seas (SCS), geogra-
phy ensures that it must transit the choke points and limited waters of the “first (and second) 
island chain.”
‒When PRC commentators first used the term “first island chain,” they did not refer to PLA 
antiaccess capabilities, but to the ability for opponents to close the oceans/maritime commons 
to the PLAN.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• USN should refocus its investment in attempting to ensure the capability needed to achieve 
sea control over the SCS, and instead focus on creating a GUIK-type barrier to PLAN deploy-
ment beyond the first island chain in any conflict.
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• Having a barrier that includes fixed SOSUS follow-on installations, forward-deployed forces, 
routine area operations, and firm alliance relations would ensure that the PRC recognizes that 
their access to the global maritime commons in peacetime is at the sufferance of the U.S. and 
its allies, thereby having a conventional deterrence effect.
‒The U.S. found this a successful approach in the Cold War.
‒Potentially this is a less costly strategy than the major increase in weapons and platforms 
required to achieve sea control in the SCS.
‒Although the PRC may seek to construct land trade and resource routes, the costs of such 
infrastructure dwarfs the costs of maritime transport, thereby forcing the PRC to spend re-
sources that could be invested in military growth.
• The key element of an ocean/global maritime commons denial strategy is maintaining the 
trust and cooperation of regional allies and assuring them of U.S. support in any conflict with 
the PRC.
‒This requires maintaining combat-credible naval (and joint military) power in the region.
‒This may also require diplomatically “taking sides” in SCS and East China Sea disputes, 
something the U.S. government has thus far avoided.
* Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts 
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UTILIZING A PROTOTYPE MOBILE OFFSHORE BASE (MOB) TO  
REESTABLISH GLOBAL NORMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
BACKGROUND
Statement of the problem:
• In violation of international law and global norms, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
has essentially “captured” the South China Sea (SCS). While not interfering—at least at 
present—with most commercial transit, PRC law has declared the South China Sea to be the 
equivalent of territorial waters.
• PRC has constructed a series of islands on reefs and awash shallows within international wa-
ters and within the disputed Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other nations. These artifi-
cial islands—sometimes dubbed the “great wall of sand”—have runways and are armed with 
antiair weapons, with indications that tunnels for additional weapons and hardened shelters 
for strike missiles are now being built.1
• In order to counter PRC claims, the U.S. Navy conducts a series of freedom of navigation 
(FON) operations, a practice that it has conducted many times over the years to challenge the 
(il)legality of such claims. However, FON ops are by necessity short-term actions that no 
longer seem to achieve the public-diplomatic effect of the Cold War era and even the recent 
past.2 As necessary as they may be from an international legal perspective, they are slowly 
becoming but a part of the background noise of the narrative.3 If the PRC wants to relegate 
them completely to the background noise, all it has to do is ignore the FONs. (Only lawyers 
would remember.)
Potential solution:
• A potentially low-cost, albeit higher-risk solution would be for the U.S. and its allies to take 
“bit-more-permanent” approach to reestablishing law and norms and emplace a mobile off-
shore base (MOB) to create an “island of freedom” in the SCS. The likely position would be 
100 miles from nearest land on the Macclesfield Bank or in Dangerous Ground to the west of 
Palawan, Philippines.
• This MOB—a concept discussed in the late 1990s—could start as a single (inoperative) oil rig 
manned by a “peace contingent” of U.S. and partner Coast Guardsmen and NOAA civilians. 
Officially it would be an aid to navigation in what is indeed very dangerous ground.
DISCUSSION
• The concept of large mobile offshore bases—as a means of maritime presence and project-
ing joint forces into a region of crises—gained temporary prominence through the writings of 
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then-JCS Vice Chairman Admiral Bill Owens in the mid-1990s. As conceived by Admiral 
Owens, MOBs (also referred to as Joint Mobile Offshore Bases) would be “built from the 
experience and technology associated with offshore oil-drilling platforms…perhaps we would 
build them by assembling components that arrive separately in the region of concern.”4
• At the high end, proponents envisioned linked-together oil rig–type platforms (generally 
self-stabilizing and not bottom-tethered) that could create runways long enough to land C-140, 
or even C-17 aircraft (6000-ft length).
• The technology necessary to link several floating oil rig platforms was demonstrated and 
experiments and studies were conducted (some funded by the Office of Naval Research) that 
suggested such links—combined with self-positioning propulsion—could prove effective 
even in challenging sea states.5
• However, the initial effort would consist of a single used oil platform (minus all oil-drilling 
equipment), with the potential of increasing the size if necessary for the effort at tacit nego-
tiations. The ultimate goal is to induce the PRC to reduce their military presence on their 
artificial islands and acknowledge global norms in the SCS.
• There is currently a glut of used/decommissioned oil rigs on the market, with auction prices 
dipping to 10% of the original construction costs.
OBSERVATIONS
• A sovereign vessel/platform positioned in an area in which there is no exposed land and con-
ducting nonmilitary missions that does not exploit resources considered protected by an EEZ 
is protected under international law.
• For the purposes of controlling the narrative, the U.S. government could express interest in 
turning the platform over to an international organization as an “island of peace.”
• The action would represent the willingness of the U.S. to act in a relatively nonconfrontational 
way and reassure the smaller states that the U.S. will not allow international law to devolve 
into a Melian dialog.
• It would buttress FON operations with a permanent regional presence.
• It would be designed as a bargaining chip; if the PRC is uncomfortable with such a platform 
emplaced in the SCS (and the potential for others), it could consider down-scoping its pres-
ence on the artificial islands.
• It represents a tool for “escalating to deescalate,” a tactic now associated with Russian foreign 
policy, but which has less-nefarious potential.
RISKS
The state-run PRC media and proxies will “scream bloody murder” in denouncing the ac-
tion—“U.S./Western imperialism,” “affronts to Chinese sovereignty,” continuation of the “100 
years of humiliation”—all the rhetoric routinely used when another nation takes any action the 
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PRC dislikes. In response, world media will profess shock and concern with alarmist reports that 
“war might be imminent” and that the U.S. is being unnecessarily provocative. (Theater like that 
sells advertising.)
• Obviously, most important is the physical reaction of the PRC government. Critics of this 
proposal would see an immediate and escalating confrontation, with PRC vessels blockading 
and forces storming the platform. Such an action would indeed by a horrendous result, but 
strategic positioning of naval assets in international waters should mitigate this threat.
• The question is: would the PRC threaten war with the United States because of a platform 
sitting in what the rest of the world considers international waters, when the consequences are 
predictable:
‒Disruption of the PRC’s international trade
‒Probable nuclearization of Japan and other Asian states
‒A permanent Western effort to contain the PRC, in the style of the Cold War
‒Potential internal Chinese discord that could challenge the CCP’s absolute control on po-
litical power. (Many in the new mainland Chinese business community may not see drastic 
action in their interest, patriotism or not.)
• The MOB would be continually subject to harassment and interference by the People’s Liber-
ation Army Navy (PLAN), PRC coast guard agencies, and the maritime militia.
‒However, the reality is that such dangers already exist in the region, with PLA aircrews 
killed and American crews endangered, not to mention the many other national fleets that 
have been harassed.
‒It is possible that harassment would increase in intensity, but since such activity has become 
“normalized” in the South China Sea, it could increase in intensity at any moment, MOB 
emplaced or not.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The U.S. should emplace an “island of freedom and peace” in the SCS.
• The initial MOB platform would remain demilitarized, with the exception of water cannon 
and the normal protective arms carried by the U.S. Coast Guard, and be rated as an aid to 
navigation and research platform. It should not appear capable of exploiting undersea resourc-
es, although it could support environmental research. Protection from harassment should be 
provided by the U.S. Navy in the current manner in which it operates in the SCS.
• The U.S. should restart research and development in major MOB technologies, developing 
the ability to expand the demilitarized platform into an actual military-capable MOB—analo-
gous to what the PRC has done in the Paracels and Spratleys.
• The U.S. should commence negotiations: if the PRC wants to expand their activities to close 
the South China Sea, the U.S. could expand its activities to keep it open. If the PRC wishes 
to reduce potential tensions, it could stop constructing artificial islands, demilitarize them, 
and turn their control over to an international organization.
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• In comparison to large military acquisition programs and operations, the cost of buying, refur-
bishing, towing, and maintaining the platform/MOB would be nominal.
• As part of the diplomatic effort, the U.S. should make it clear that it intends to eventually 
turn control of the platform over to the United Nations or the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), if the PRC indicates a sincere willingness to negotiate on an end to island 
building and militarization.
NOTES:
1. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “A Constructive Year for Chinese Base Building,” De-
cember 14, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/constructive-year-Chinese-building
2. An argument that the “consistent practice of free navigation” is as effective (or not) as formal 
FON operations can be found in Peter A. Dutton and Isaac B. Kardon, “Forget the FONOPs—
Just Fly, Sail, Operate Wherever International Law Allows,” Lawfare (blog), June 10, 2017, 
https://lawfareblog.com/forget-fonops-%E2%80%94- just-fly-sail-and-operate-whereever 
-international-law-allows.
3. See discussion in Ralph Jennings, “China Calmed Asian Maritime Dispute in 2017 without 
Ceding Sovereignty,” Voice of America News, December 11, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/
south-china-sea-disputes-calming- down/4158167.html.
4. Admiral William A. Owens, USN, High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World  
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 162–63.
5. Studies include: Ronald N. Kostoff, Floating Ocean Platform (Office of Naval Research, c. 
1991), Anouck R. Girard, et al., An Experimental Testbed for Mobile Offshore Base Control  
Concepts (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 2001), https://whale.fe.up.pt/Papers/2001/PAPER 
_HAWAII2001.pdf, and W. L. Greer, project leader, Mobile Offshore Base Operational Utility and 
Cost Study, IDA Paper P-3573 (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, January 2001).
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TRANSCENDENT WARS OF THE 21st CENTURY
BACKGROUND
• Competition is fundamental to evolutionary life, conflict habitual to human nature. Ours is a 
history of shared interests and disputed differences, a collective heritage cultivated through 
progressive partnerships of cooperation and commerce, yet punctuated by the exclamations of 
war and conquest.
• Acknowledging that force inevitably begets force, military strength in mutually assured de-
structive balance has now manifested more than a half century of global armistice, despite 
disrupting outbursts of regional instability that previously might have conscripted allies into 
broader conflict. Though we continue to live under the shadow of nuclear confrontation, it is 
this assured response of overwhelming retaliatory devastation that has served well in preserv-
ing international security and our domestic welfare.
• But today something fundamental has changed. Projections of past strategic concepts of do-
main dominance and force deployment are increasingly antiquated in a world of geographic 
inconsequence, non-nation-state actors, global information connectivity, and exponential 
technological change.
• Resultant emerging technologies inevitably precipitate new opportunities and new threats. 
Radical new technologies are appearing at the convergence of accelerating progress in nan-
otechnologies, biotechnologies, and information technologies. They express themselves in 
applications exploiting advanced molecular materials, microfabrication, genetic engineering, 
robotics, artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Their accompanying innovations 
already can be recognized in the expansive “internet of things,” the omniscient informatics 
of big data, the ominous creations of synthetic biology, and the promises and perils of auton-
omous thinking machines. Their new domains of operation extend from cyberspace to outer 
space, and into the neuroscience of our minds.
Advanced technology weapons are becoming smaller, faster, cheaper, smarter and increasingly 
autonomous, more (or less) lethal, distributed, resilient, adaptable, and accessible.
• We have reached an inflection point of transcendent technological advantage that alters the 
foundational principles of deterrence, domain supremacy and operational warfare. Conven-
tional force deployment and utilization are increasingly vulnerable to countermanding attack 
using emerging technology weapons.
• Furthermore, such military advancements are no longer the primary stimulus for disruptive 
technology research and development, but increasingly exploit adaptations of innovation mi-
grating first from the readily accessible commercial sector.
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• Also notably, the speed of appearance, adoption and adaptation of these new weapons systems 
far outpaces current practices for traditional military technology acquisition and deployment.
• Across all domains of war, technology accelerates exponentially. Unilateral dominance at all 
times across all potential domains of conflict - land, sea, air, space and cyberspace – is un-
sustainable without unrealistically substantial investments of financial and intellectual capital. 
How will our national defense strategies adjust in a volatile world of unstable balances, with 
adversaries who in some domains of conflict for some periods of time may hold superior, 
even potentially decisive, advantage?
DISCUSSION
• In the dynamic domain of space, remote-sensing technologies, especially those deployed using 
small satellite swarms at low Earth orbit, allow continuous detection, location and monitoring 
of conventional warfighting assets for friends and foes alike.
• Besides ensuring the militarization of near-Earth space, such observational information 
makes large deployed platforms such as aircraft carriers highly vulnerable if not operationally 
impractical.
• Even our most secure nuclear deterrent asset, submerged nuclear submarines, will soon be-
come trackable and susceptible to attack.
• In this near future, the scales of military action and counteraction, of risk and cost, of threat 
and consequence, collectively will become dangerously imbalanced.
• Quietly, the next world war may have already begun, to be found on the battlefields of infor-
mation.
• Beyond conventional warfare, the intrinsic dependence of civilian and military systems and 
supporting infrastructures on operations in cyberspace open whole new pathways for informa-
tion gathering and operational exploitation, disruption and harm.
• Cyberwarfare already occurs today, though still below the threshold of direct kinetic conflict. 
It has become a competitive domain unto itself, and is increasingly recognized as a dynamic 
component of conflict in all other warfighting domains as well.
• Moreover, in unconstrained warfare, sustained information dominance across the electromag-
netic spectrum may not be possible.
• Similarly, the material logistics of war are evolving rapidly. In nanotechnologies, emergent 
molecular materials unimagined even a decade ago are beginning to revolutionize the design 
and construction of new civilian and military systems, especially as controls over electromag-
netics, photonics and heat. Already advanced manufacturing technologies such as 3-D print-
ing enable on-location on-demand delivery of essential equipment and parts while bypassing 
traditional supply chain logistics and associated limitations. Additionally, microfabrication 
technologies support the rapid construction of self-configuring nanobots operating with dis-
tributed intelligence on miniature to molecular scales, with a growing inventory of achievable 
tasks and applications.
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• In biotechnology, repair or whole replacement of injured and diseased organs is near, both 
from use of engineered prosthetics and the promise of undifferentiated stem cell therapies. 
More profoundly, we are now moving beyond simply reading genetic code to effectively writ-
ing new code. In the emergent field of synthetic biology, code writers can make use of a ge-
netic alphabet supplemented beyond the traditional four nucleotide bases bequeathed to us by 
natural evolution. In addition to supporting genetic refinements and innovative treatments for 
medical conditions and diseases, these synthetic biology applications can also create uncon-
strained designer variations of lethal or debilitating pathogens with   extended latency, against 
which we have no human immunity and no immediate preventive or remediating treatments. 
Associated biological weapons can be created in small research laboratories and delivered to 
target populations using nothing more sophisticated than a jar full of mosquitoes. How will 
we respond when such technologies are used to incapacitate military forces or to carry out 
ethnically targeted genocide with genetic identity precision?
• Arguably the greatest emerging technological threat and greatest ascending opportunity is in 
the field of artificial intelligence. Machines learning from us, with us, and ultimately without 
us, represent the transcendence of sentient intelligence beyond the limitations of our biolog-
ical brains. All that we have achieved as humans has been accomplished using a biocomputer 
that operates with an 8Hz central processor and inefficient peripheral interfaces, requires 
continuous oxygen and chemical energy supplies, suffers substantial maintenance down time 
(normally about eight hours every day) with faulty neuro-wiring and high error rate perfor-
mance, and must withstand a soft-target susceptibility to injury or destruction.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Of immediate importance, we must find new and compelling deterrents to the perceived ad-
vantages of preemptive first strike and technological extortions for geopolitical submission or 
the world may once again find itself at the brink of war.
• We should work resolutely with all nations invested in space activities to expand cooperative 
partnerships, extend “open skies” policies and develop international space law standards that 
emulate our maritime “open seas” agreements.
• Command, control and communications are increasingly subject to interception, distortion or 
denial. In the absence of such reliable information connectivity, mission-centered leadership 
and quasi-autonomous decision-making will be vital for operational success. Concurrently, 
we will require a force structure that supports both agile joint service leadership operating 
across all domains, and deep technological expertise for personnel operating within those 
domains.
• Furthermore, in any coming conflict, the creative energy for rapid innovation that is a de-
fining characteristic of many American technology companies today will be as important a 
national asset as was our manufacturing industrial base throughout World War II. Specifical-
ly, the purposeful partnership and integration of civilian and military space and cyberspace 
industries should not wait.
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• The “stuff of war” will be dramatically different even a decade from now, but only if we em-
brace the exponential pace of change reinventing the material world.
• While our attention and strategic investments principally have been focused on incremental 
projections of past warfighting concepts into the near future, new domains of emergent war-
fare have arisen that promise soon to eclipse our essential understanding of conflict and its 
conduct. “Breaking the mold” of incremental thinking and projections of existing force struc-
ture challenges us to recognize that we must not simply “think out of the box,” but appreciate 
that in the very near technologically accelerating future, “the box” no longer exists. And with 
this understanding comes the questions that we truly need to be asking.
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EMPLOYING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) IN NAVAL WARFARE 
(NOT NAVAL WEAPONS)
BACKGROUND
• We have a long way to go before we can have a reliable AI in the cockpits, conning towers 
and on the bridges of our future Fleet. Regardless of the seemingly insurmountable resource 
investment in time, effort hardware and money, we must start the process now in order to 
identify the challenges and limitations, learn from mistakes, wrestle with legal and policy 
questions (which must also be identified), catch up to our adversary, and be prepared to use 
AI to win at sea.
• State of Development:
DISCUSSION
• IBM Watson vs. Jeopardy. After years of development, IBM’s AI defeated Jeopardy champions.
• AlphaGo, AlphaGo Zero, AlphaGo Zero + Humans. Using the most ancient/difficult strat-
egy board game, an AI was taught the game using previous matches (AlphaGo beat the Go 
Champ 4 to 1), then given only the rules (AlphaGo Zero beat AlphaGo 100 to 0), then part-
nered with humans to become the best.
• IBM Watson & Oncology. By feeding IBM’s Watson foundational works, training it through 
analysis of answers, providing thousands of previous cases, and continuously adding to its 
known literature, leading American oncologists have an AI that can save tremendous amounts 
of time in the identification of cancer cure regimens. (Admittedly, there have been some chal-
lenges that IBM and oncologists are still working to solve on a global basis).
• China’s AI-powered robot Xiaoyi passed the country’s medical licensing exam (before IBM 
Watson).
• The Good News: Capabilities are available and ready for partnering with institutions to start 
humans’ and machines’ learning and knowledge refinement processes.
RECOMMENDATION
That the Navy partner with IBM to utilize Watson in the analysis of naval warfare, education, 
and acquisition decisions using two steps and focusing on three application areas.
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• Two Steps
1. Under a Cooperative Research & Development Agreement (CRADA), provide the corpus for 
Naval Warfare and refine the machines’ understanding of the subject
2. Using historic examples of naval battles, further refine the machines’ expertise
• Three Applications (‘*’ Indicates 1 or 2 recommended focus areas for the CRADA)
1. Wargaming & Warfighting
• Use AI as a reference/advice tool. With the Naval War College’s library at its fingertips, it 
can provide referenced answers to questions within seconds
• Provide trained/refined AI to Fleet & Strike Group Staffs for plan development.
• * Refinement of unmanned systems’ (UxS) mission planning and targeting algorithms to 
drive mission success and target selection accuracy to acceptable levels
2. Education & Innovation
• Introduce trained/refined AI into PXO/PCO, TAO & Staff Courses to begin the human educa-
tion process and explore potential AI uses
• Explore UxS TTP and AI assisted decision-making in mixed reality & gaming environments
• Combined AI/UxS strike group in Norfolk (multinational?) for experimentation
3. Acquisition/Recruiting with Strategy
• * Provide AI ‘rules’ for acquisition, allow the AI to produce an independent acquisition plan 
& determine probability of success against 2045 adversary
• Provide AI retention/attrition rates & validate/refine recruiting quotas using current fleet acqui-
sition model & AI generated model
• Challenges/Concerns: Job security (need for experts increases); copyright infringement (not 
an issue in past AI endeavors); the subject is too vast and would take too long (what better 
reason to start now!)
Bottom line: A trained & educated AI can provide timely, unemotional, unbiased assessments, 
feedback, and recommendations through informed analytical rigor at scale. Humans determine 




Prof. John Jackson, Chair of Unmanned and Robotic Systems, NWC, jacksonj@usnwc.edu
26 February 2018
THE BIG IDEA: MODERN MULTIMISSION AIRSHIPS
BACKGROUND
• 1,000 cubic feet of helium can lift 65 pounds into the air.
• In 1933, the rigid airship USS Macon (ZRS 5) used 7 million cubic feet of helium to carry 
five Sparrow Hawk scout aircraft and a crew of 60 at speeds up to 75 knots over ranges of up 
to 6,000 miles.
• None of the 89,000 ships (in convoys) escorted by blimps in World War II were sunk.
• On March 15, 1957, after having flown 9,448 miles in 264 hours (just over 10 days), the Snow 
Bird (ZPG 2) landed at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida. The flight had crossed the Atlan-
tic, flown over the western shores of Africa and Europe, and then crossed the Atlantic from 
east to west. In the process it set new records for unrefueled distance and flight time. Airships 
frequently flew when heavier-than-air planes were grounded due to bad weather.
• In 1960, the Navy’s nonrigid ZPG-3W airship carried 100,000 pounds aloft using a 1.5 mil-
lion cubic foot envelope. It carried a crew of 22 on missions of up to 58 hours of uninterrupt-
ed and unrefueled flight.
DISCUSSION
• Lockheed Martin’s “skunk works” has been test-flying a hybrid airship prototype (P 791) 
since 2006, and has recently received a contract to build 12 hybrid airships, each capable of 
carrying a payload of 47,000 pounds (including up to 19 passengers) at a cruising speed of 60 
knots with a range of 1,400 nautical miles.
Google co-founder Sergey Brin is currently constructing a $100-million rigid airship in the same 
Moffatt Field hangar that housed the USS Macon more than nine decades ago. The purpose for 
which the airship is being built has not been publicly announced, but use as a disaster response 
vehicle and/or a private air yacht have been rumored.
United Kingdom’s Hybrid Air Vehicles, Ltd., is repurposing the aircraft built for the U.S. Army’s 
Long Endurance Multi-Sensor Vehicle (LEMV), which was conceptualized as an unmanned ISR 
platform designed to execute surveillance missions of up to three weeks over a given target. The 
Airlander-10 is being converted into a manned passenger-carry aircraft.
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QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION:
1. Could a large-scale airship, utilizing modern materials, ballast-control systems, and lightweight 
yet powerful engines, be used for the following?
a. Long-range and long-endurance maritime patrol.
b. Launching large quantities of missiles and/or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and UAV 
swarms.
c. Heavy-lift cargo transportation at speeds faster than ships and at much reduced fuel costs 
per ton-mile.
d. C4ISR missions. The large gas envelop and lifting capacity could support large antenna 
arrays, huge sensor suites, and extended mission profiles.
.
2. Could such vehicles be survivable in combat and/or combat-support situations?
3. Could modern airships operate in weather conditions likely to be encountered in routine operations?
4. Could modern airships be operated in unmanned or optionally manned modes?
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THE FUTURE FORCE: BLUE HAIR IN THE GRAY ZONE* 
BACKGROUND
What does the warrior of the future look like? What are the roles and missions the United States 
will need to prepare its people for? What are the technologies those warriors must master in order 
to succeed at their mission? According to the advocates of the Third Offset, the victors of future 
war will be those states that are best able to harness autonomy and human-machine integration. 
However, the Department of Defense is struggling with how to recruit and retain these best and 
brightest of emerging technology. This discussion examines how military culture and perceptions 
of what the military warrior looks like could impact the United States’ long term strategic compe-
tition with rising adversaries.
DISCUSSION
Third Offset, autonomy, and the future force:
• Third Offset argues for a focus on autonomy. Harnessing autonomous research for national 
defense will be the role of technologists, not technologies. The future force of warriors will 
be made up of computer programmers, air defense commanders with expertise on the algo-
rithms that undergird their weapon systems, sailors able to reconfigure battle networks while 
taking fire, hackers in deployed locations and at home, and big-data analysts in forward oper-
ating bases and staff commands. Whether the future warriors are directing technology on the 
battlefield or remotely, they will need to adapt to high-tech threats and high-tech machines in 
real time.
• Further, while manpower problems are often framed as an issue for existential conflicts, 
solving manpower issues is increasingly vital to winning conflicts in the gray zone. Gray-
zone conflicts—defined by limited wars, coercive missions, and deterrence—are increasingly 
dominated by technological innovation. Cyber, space, the electromagnetic spectrum, and 
information are all contested on a day-to-day basis. Winning in the gray zone, unlike the large 
armies of territorial conflict, is battled from long distances by remote operators who influence 
and change adversary behaviors from behind keyboards instead of from gun sights.
• Role of culture and society in perceptions of military caste. So much of what we as a society 
think is a military warrior is based on our cultural understandings of what the military caste 
looks like—a problem that may be exacerbated as the civil-military divide continues to grow. 
Standards for tattoos, beards, hair length/color, and makeup for women have all changed over 
time with changes in society and fashion.
• Are physical fitness standards not tied to mission requirements also arbitrarily exclusive?
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RECOMMENDATION
• Conduct reexamination of the kind of talent we need to win future wars
—How do we recruit this talent and retain them?
—What is their role (civilian, contractor, on the battlefield, at home) in war?
—Are they lawful combatants?
• Continue to implement creative ways to on-board special talent into the military
• Identify must-fill technology skill sets beyond “cyber” or “information assurance”
—I.e., network architects, software developers, artificial intelligence scientists, etc.
• Develop a way to assess the qualitative technological capability of DoD employees
• Examine whether physical fitness and grooming standards represent the needs of the mission, 
not a perception of “discipline” or what a military member “should” look like
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RETHINKING FORWARD PRESENCE AND FORWARD DEFENSE
BACKGROUND
The U.S. Navy is committed to providing forward presence and, in extremis, forward defense, 
globally (although it focuses most closely on the European, Greater Middle Eastern, and western 
Pacific AORs). Given the limited number of naval assets available, forward presence leads to 
high operating tempos, forward-based forces, recruitment and retention issues, as well as demands 
for greater numbers of platforms. Moreover, if deterrence fails and forward-deployed naval forces 
must fight, the focus on fighting forward is a risky strategy. If war breaks out in an A2/AD envi-
ronment while U.S. naval forces are conducting ordinary presence missions, the risks to the fleet 
are high if fighting occurs inside the “range rings” or they are required to “fight their way back 
in.” Rethinking forward presence/forward defense and adopting a different posture could lead to a 
more effective and efficient way to use scarce USN resources and ensure that the battle of the first 
salvo or a short-sharp fight does not endanger U.S. naval supremacy, regionally or globally.
DISCUSSION
• Per the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strate-
gy (NDS), great-power war is now the primary focus of U.S. naval forces
• The two prospective great powers (China and Russia) and several so-called rogue states (e.g., 
Iran) possess advanced A2/AD systems and practice asymmetric tactics.
• Within deep range of adversary land-based air and missile-reconnaissance-strike systems, 
USN forces are highly vulnerable.
• There is a trade-off between forward presence to reassure friends and allies and the opera-
tional requirements of deterring and winning wars against great powers deploying A2/AD 
systems.
• Taking a maximalist approach to the concept of operating forward leads to strategies, plans, 
and acquisition approaches that are expensive and dangerous.
• American national interests do not require forward presence, much less forward defense, in 
the maritime domain.
RECOMMENDATION
The U.S. Navy should rethink how it supports the NSS and NDS. During the Cold War, the Navy 
did not generally (with regularity) operate within close range of the Soviet Union. It should not 
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